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WATER AS AN ARTICLE OF COMMERCE: STATE 
EMBARGOES SPRING A LEAK UNDER 
SPORHASEv.NEBRASKA 
Edward B. Schwartz* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, water has become the focus of increased 
national attention, and may well be at the center of the most 
divisive political and legal battles in the years ahead. 1 While 
different interests such as agriculture, industry, energy develop-
ment, and municipalities compete for the use of already limited 
water resources, supplies continue to decline.2 Although water 
supply problems exist nationwide, in the arid West, water is being 
used faster than nature can replenish it, and supplies are rapidly 
diminishing. For example, the Ogallala Aquifer,3 which supplies 
drinking water for two million people, is being reduced by three 
feet per year, and could be dry in thirty years.4 In the East, more 
and more communities face water shortages because of pollution, 
antiquated and decaying pipelines, and inadequate storage capac-
.. EditQr-in-Chief 1983-1984, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 See generally Golden, The OPEC of the Midwest, 1)ME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 80; Sheets, 
Water, Will We Have Enough fo Go Around?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 29, 
1981, at 34 [hereinafter cited as Sheets, Enough]; Sheets, War Over Water Crisis of the 
80's, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 31, 1983, at 57 [hereinafter cited as Sheets, 
Crisis]. 
2 See generally Sheets, Enough, supra note 1; Sheets, Crisis, supra note 1; UNITED 
STATES WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 1975-2000, 
SECOND NATIONAL WATER AsSESSMENT 2-81 (1978). 
3 An aquifer is "[a] geological formation or layer of material that is porous or perme-
able to water, thus capable of containing or carrying ground water." 7 WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS 273 (R. Clark ed. 1976); see generally WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.2 
(R. Clark ed. 1967). 
4 Sheets, Crisis, supra note 1, at 60. 
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ity.5 As the gap between supply and demand widens, disputes over 
water are likely to intensify. "The issue of water rights" has thus 
been described by one expert as "a bomb sitting there ready to 
explode."6 How the dust settles could determine not only the 
shape of America's agriculture and industry, but also which 
towns and cities will survive and prosper in the coming decades.7 
In resolving these disputes, questions of the proper role of 
states, and that of the federal government, in allocating limited 
water supplies must be addressed. While water rights have tradi-
tionally been regulated almost exclusively by the states, the Con-
gress possesses significant authority to regulate water use. The 
potential for heated federal-state conflicts exists, therefore, as 
thirsty communities and industries battle for dwindling water 
resources. 
Currently, the federal government regulates water in a number 
of ways.8 For example, federal statutes insure free navigation in 
the nation's waters,9 control water pollution,t° protect wildlife,ll 
and protect coastal areas.12 There is little federal law, however, 
regulating the rights of private water users.13 Rather, Congress 
has consistently chosen to give the states free reign to regulate 
water distribution and to take steps to preserve water for its 
citizens.14 One way states do so is by enacting water "embargo" 
statutes which limit or prohibit water exports to a neighboring 
state. 
In July, 1982, the United States Supreme Court struck down, in 
part, a Nebraska statute which greatly limited the right of its 
5 Sheets, E'TWU{}h, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
6 Sheets, Crisis, supra note 1, at 57. 
1 "Deciding who wins and who loses [in the upcoming wars over water] will go far 
toward shaping the U.S. in the 21st century." [d. at 62. 
8 See generaUy Shea, Coordination and Consensus in Water Resource Management, 13 
PAC. L.J. 975 (1980); Rhodes, Developing a National Water Policy: Problems and Perspec-
tives on Reform, 8 J. LEGIS. 1 (1981). 
9 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U.S.C. §§ 401-419a (1982). 
10 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
11 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662 (1982). 
12 Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982). 
13 "The federal government has little water law that resembles ... state water law. 
The national government does not concern itself with the property rights of water users; 
it does not regulate the conduct of citizens or plan what they may do with water." 
Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-State Water Law and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. 
REV. 751, 755 (1980). 
" See infra text and notes at notes 204, 285. 
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citizens to export ground water15 to another state. In Sporhase v. 
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,16 the Court found that the Nebraska 
statute violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Con-
stitution.17 The Sporhase decision is important because it makes 
possible a significant shift in authority over water rights and 
distribution away from the states to the federal government. The 
decision is significant also in that the Supreme Court for the first 
time held that water, when moved from one state to another, 
constitutes an article of interstate commerce. The decision thus 
subjects to commerce clause analysis state statutes which restrict 
the interstate transfer of water. IS Sporhase might thus be viewed 
as a first step toward total federal control over water use and 
water rights. Should water shortages reach crisis proportions, the 
issues may no longer be, can and will the federal government 
wrest control over water use from the states, but how and when it 
will do so. 
The impact of Sporhase, however, might not be so dramatic. In 
an attempt to balance the states' strong interest in preserving 
water for its own citizens against the competing federal interest 
in the free flow of commerce among the states, the Court also 
found that states may still restrict or even prohibit water exports, 
so long as they do so in a "reasonable" manner. In order to 
discriminate against non-residents in the allocation of its water, a 
state must simply demonstrate sufficient need.19 In relying on this 
type of balancing test, the case presents a useful example of how 
the Supreme Court uses the commerce clause to reconcile compet-
ing demands for diminishing natural resources. In addition, 
Sporhase may reveal problems inherent in the Court's application 
of traditional commerce clause analysis to areas of traditional 
state sovereignty. 
Although the long-term impact of Sporhase is unclear, the 
Court's decision has already had an effect on the water resource 
management policies of a number of states. At the time of the 
Sporhase decision, fourteen Western states had statutes which 
15 Ground water is water below the surface of the earth, which is contained chiefly in 
pores and crevices of the rock mantle. 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 294 (R. Clark ed. 
1976); see generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 
16 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3. See generally infra text and notes at notes 25-61. 
18 458 U.S. at 945-54. 
19 458 U.S. at 954-58. 
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limited or prohibited the export ofwater.20 Two embargo statutes 
were repealed,21 and one statute was struck down by a federal 
district court,22 since the Court's decision. A number of other 
statutes are at least as restrictive as the portion of the Nebraska 
statute struck down in Sporhase; successful enforcement of their 
provisions is unlikely.23 Other statutes, however, will survive 
Sporhase, because the decision left the states some authority to 
restrict water exports. 
This article will first briefly examine the limitations imposed on 
state police powers by the commerce clause. Second, it will review 
the development and nature of state water embargo statutes. 
Third, it will recount the Supreme Court's past decisions when 
faced with a commerce clause challenge to a state water embargo 
statute. Fourth, it will summarize the Supreme Court's decision 
in Sporhase and evaluate the likely impact of that decision on 
state water embargoes and on federal regulation of water. Fifth, 
this article will examine at length the possible arguments in 
support of removing water embargo24 statutes entirely from the 
scope of the commerce clause. This discussion will focus on the 
state ownership theory, the argument that water is not an 
article of commerce, the exceptional police powers argument, the 
state as market participant exception, and the concept of state 
sovereignty. Finally, this article will conclude that although the 
Supreme Court was correct in finding that there are no available 
arguments which would entirely exempt water embargo statutes 
20 The statutes include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153B (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 37-81-101 (Supp. 1980); IDAlIa CODE § 42-408 (1977); !CAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-726 (1977); 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-1-121 (t979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233.01, -613.01 (1978); 
NEV. REV. STAT § 533.520 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 537.810 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
82, § 1085.2.2 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1979); S.D. CaMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 46-1-13 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 90.03.300, .16.110, .16.120 (1962); WYo. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977). 
21 COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (1973) (repealed 1983); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977) 
(repealed 1983). 
22 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978) (repealed 1983). See City of EI Paso v. Reynolds, 
563 F. SI,lPp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). 
23 The embargo statutes of Idaho, Nevada, and Washington, for example, c-ontain 
reciprocity provisions similar to the Nebr~ka provision struck by the Supreme Court in 
Sporhase, see supra text and notes !it notes 141-157, and their continued vitality is 
doubtful. See IDAHO CODE § 42-408 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 5a.515, 53.520 (1979); WASH. 
REV. CoDE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962). 
2. A water embargo, or anti-exportation statute, is a legislative prohibition or restric-
tion of the individual landowner's ability to transfer water outside ofthe enacting state. 
See infra text and notes at notes 62-78. 
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from commerce clause treatment, the commerce clause is a 
clumsy tool with which to balance the complex, competing federal 
and state interests in this area. The more appropriate decision 
might have been to defer to the Congress to resolve this dispute. 
II. THE COMl\IERCE CLAUSE LlMITATlON ON STATE POllCE 
POWERS 
The few words of the commerce clause belie the broad scope of 
its current authority. Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitu-
tion grants to Congress the power to "[r]egulate commerce with 
foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes."25 This language clearly arose from the framers' great 
concern that state-imposed trade barriers would impede the de-
velopment of a unified nation.26 Yet, during the two centuries that 
the Supreme Court has attempted to define the proper role of the 
Constitution in achieving national economic unity, the Commerce 
Clause has been interpreted in a variety of ways. While it is now 
generally accepted that the commerce clause plays a proper role 
both in delineating Congress's powers and in preserving the 
federalist system, the debate continues over the extent to which it 
enhances federal powers and limits those of the statesP 
The contours of the commerce clause were first developed in 
Gibbons v. Ogden. There, the Supreme Court examined whether 
the commerce clause prohibited any state statute which 
conflicted with a federal statute enacted pursuant to the com-, 
merce powers of the Congress.28 Chief Justice Marshall held that 
it did, despite the lack of any explicit prohibition in the language 
of the commerce clause against state regulation of commercial 
activities. The Chief Justice reasoned that "when a State proceeds 
to regulate commerce ... among the several states, it is exercising 
25 U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c.3. 
26 H.P. HQod & Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-35 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 
294 U.S. 511, 521-23 (1935); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
244 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]. In fact, the calling of the Constitutional 
Convention can be traced, in part, to the prevalence of trade barriers and economic 
warfare between the states. BROWNE & DUMARS, State Taxation on Natural Resources 
Eictraction and the Commerce Clause; Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 ORE. L. REV. 7, 
11-12 (1981). 
27 See e.g., Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982). 
28 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.> 1 (1824). In Ogden, the Supreme Court struck down a New York 
statute granting a steamboat license monopoly which conflicted with a federal licensing 
law. 
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the very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very 
thing which Congress is authorized to do."29 
The next great expansion of the commerce clause occurred in 
1851 in Cooley v. Board ofWardens.30 There, the Court first held 
that the commerce clause limited state action which burdened 
interstate commerce even in areas where Congress had not spo-
ken.31 InBoard of Wardens , the Court found that it was the nature 
of the regulated activity, rather than Congressional presence, 
which determined whether state regulation violated the com-
merce clause. This was the birth of the "dormant" commerce 
powers of the Congress.32 
The doctrine of the dormant commerce powers is based on the 
concept that the regulation of "commerce among the states" is 
primarily within the province of the federal government, and that 
absent Congressional authorization, the states may not encroach 
on Congress' constitutionally delegated authority. It recognizes 
that preventing parochial state legislation which has the effect of 
impeding the free flow of commerce among the states is as essen-
tial to a unified national economy as ensuring that the federal 
government has the authority to enact national commercial legis-
lation.33 
The dormant commerce powers of the Congress, however, do 
not bar all state actions which burden interstate commerce. 
Under the police powers,34 states may regulate matters of local 
concern in pursuit of the health, safety, and the welfare of their 
citizens. Such regulation could, however, act as a barrier to inter-
state trade. For example, a state law limiting the length of trains 
28 ld. at 199-200. 
30 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The Court upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring the 
hiring of local pilots for ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia. The Court 
distinguished subjects requiring uniform regulation, which could never be regulated by 
the states, from those better suited for local regulation. This distinction is no longer 
determinative. See J. NowAK, supra note 22, at 250-66. 
3) Board o/Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318-20. 
32 ld. at 319. 
33 See J. NowAK, supra note 26, at 250-52. 
34 The police powers are not specifically provided for in the Constitution. Rather, the 
term police powers is used by the Supreme Court to describe "that immense mass of 
legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a state not surrendered to 
the general government; all of which can be most advantageously exercised by the 
states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as 
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, and those which respect 
turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 
(9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824). See generaUy J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 243-66. 
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which passed through its state, allegedly enacted to promote 
safety, burdened interstate rail transportation and was struck 
down.3s Similarly, a city ordinance which required that all milk 
sold within its limits be pasteurized within five miles of the city, 
allegedly enacted to facilitate plant inspection, also had the effect 
of impermissibly excluding milk processed in neighboring states.36 
Commerce clause decisions, therefore, have focused broadly on 
reconciling the often conflicting police interest of the state, and 
the federal interest in the free interstate flow of commerce. 
After Board of Wardens, the Court continued to delineate the 
permissible extent of state encroachment on interstate commerce 
by examining the nature of the regulated activity.37 The Court 
employed, at various times, several different mechanical tests, 
including distinguishing subjects requiring national uniform reg-
ulation from those of local concern,38 distinguishing production 
from commerce,39 determining what falls within the "stream of 
commerce,"40 and distinguishing activities having a direct versus 
an indirect effect on commerce.41 None of these mechanical tests 
proved to be adequate, however, for the difficult task of reconcil-
ing conflicting state and federal interests.42 These artificial ap-
proaches merely served to prevent the Court from resolving such 
conflicts in the manner it was straining toward: balancing the 
state interest in the regulation against the statute's burden on 
commerce.43 
The approach currently taken by the Supreme Court in recon-
ciling the competing interests of the state in effecting their police 
powers and the national interest in the free interstate flow of 
commerce can be traced back to Justice Stone's famous dissent in 
Disanto v. Pennsylvania.44 Under the modern approach, first 
35 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
36 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
37 See J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 248. 
38 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
39 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
40 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
41 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
42 J. NowAK, supra note 26, at 250. 
43 [d. at 251. 
44 273 U.S. 34 (1927). In Disanto, the majority struck down a Pennsylvania statute 
requiring sellers of steamboat tickets to pay a fee for an annual license. The Court found 
that the statute impermissibly regulated an activity requiring uniform nationallegisla-
tion. Justice Stone dissented, rejecting the Court's application of an expanded Board of 
Wardens test, in which the Court determines whether the subject area being regulated is 
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adopted by the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,45 for-
malistic tests are rejected in favor of balancing the local benefits 
of the statute against the federal commerce interest. The modern 
balancing approach of the Court was summarized most succinctly 
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.: 
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate local 
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree 
and the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of 
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, 
and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.46 
As this quotation suggests, the Court considers four factors in 
determining the constitutionality of state regulations which im-
pede interstate commerce: 1) whether the alleged purpose of the 
statute is "legitimate" -i.e., is within the state's police powers;47 
2) whether the statute "effectuates" the alleged purpose;48 
3) whether the statute treats residents and non-residents 
"evenhandedly";49 and 4) whether the state has chosen the means 
one requiring uniform or local regulation, and whether the burden on commerce is direct 
or indirect. Justice Stone argued that the Board a/Wardens approach was too IIlechan-
ical and theoretical. In his view, "those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be 
sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominallY indirect, but because a 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its 
function, the character of the busine$s involved and the actual effect on the flow of 
commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local 
and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce 
across state lines." 273 U.S. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stone's thesis was further developed by Professor Dowling in an article which 
greatly influenced the Court's approach to the commerce clause. See Dowling, Interstate 
Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940). Professor Dowling argued that the 
court should acknowledge that, rather than actually applying a mechanical test, what it 
was doing was "balancing national and local interest and making a choice as to which of 
the two should prevaiL" Id. at 21. Under his approach, the Court should weigh the local 
benefits of the statl,lte against the national commerce interests. If the court upholds the 
statute, Congress can do nothing, and the statute remains; or it can regulate the area 
and displace the statute. If the court strikes down the statute, Congress can resurrect it 
by expressing its approval. See generaUy J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 250-52. 
45 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
46 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
47 See e.g., Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954-55. 
46 Id. at 955-56. 
49 Id. 
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to achieve the alleged purpose which has the least burdensome 
impact on interstate commerce. 50 Once these tests are satisfied, 
the Court will then balance the local benefits of the regulation 
against the burden on commerce, upholding the statute unless 
the latter is "clearly excessive." Legislation which on its face 
discriminates against non-residents, however, will be justified 
only by a much greater local interest, and could be invalid p~r se.51 
States regulate commerce in a number of ways. There are 
statutes regulating transportation, 52 incoming commerce,53 per-
sonal mobility, 54 and outgoing commerce. The last category in-
cludes embargoes on water and other natural resources. During 
the twentieth century, the Court generally has taken a dim view 
of state regulations limiting the export of a state's natural re-
sources.55 The Supreme Court has struck down, for example, regu-
lations prohibiting or restricting the interstate trade of natural 
gas,56 shrimp,57 fishing rights,58 minnows,59 and rights to the use of 
waste disposal sites.60 Explaining these decisions, the Court has 
specifically held that "[a] State is without power to prevent pri-
vately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in 
interstate commerce on the grounds that they are required to 
satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of 
the State."61 Against this backdrop of Supreme Court opposition 
to natural resource embargoes, a state defending its water em-
bargo statute would be forced to argue that water was somehow 
unique, and water use regulations should not be subjected to the 
same commerce clause scrutiny as embargoes of other natural 
resources. It would have to be argued that it is within the prov-
50 See e.g., Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. 
;;1 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
52 See e.g., Southern Pacific Co., 325 U.S. 761. 
53 See e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
54 See e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
55 See Comment, Commerce Clause Limits States' Ability to Stop Groundwater Ex-
ports: Supreme Court Overturns Nebraska Reciprocity Rule, 12 ENVTL L. REP. (ENVTL 
L. INST.) 10083, 10086 (Sept. 1982). 
56 West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553 (1923). 
57 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). 
58 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 
265 (1977). 
59 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
60 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
61 Foster Fountain Packing Co., 278 U.S. at 10. 
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ince of each state to protect the water within its boundaries for 
use by its own residents. Assuming this to be the case, many 
states have enacted embargo statutes; and for many years, these 
statutes went unchallenged. 
III. WATER EMBARGO STATUTES 
A. Development 
The federal government does not regulate individual water 
rights.62 Rather, each state has developed its own statutes and 
common law delineating the rights of landowners to the use of 
water on, under and adjacent to their land.63 The laws of each 
state are tailored to coordinate the water needs of its citizens with 
the unique climactic, hydrological and topographical conditions of 
62 See supra note 13. 
6.1 With regard to ground water in particular, four basic doctrines exist which establish 
the individual's right to the use of water: 1) the rule of absolute ownership; 2) the 
reasonable use doctrine; 3) the correlative rights doctrine; and 4) the prior appropriation 
doctrine. Each Western state follows one or more of these doctrines. 
The rule of absolute ownership grants the landowner the unlimited use of any ground 
water underneath his property. Once the law throughout the West, the absolute own-
ership doctrine was found to be inconsistent with the conservation policies of most 
Western states. It has therefore been rejected or substantially modified in all of the 
Western states except Texas. 
In reasonable use states, when a dispute arises between landowners over the use of 
ground water, it is the job of the court to determine if either use is wasteful, or is not 
reasonable in relation to the use of the overlying land. The reasonable use doctrine, 
followed by Nebraska, Arizona, and Oklahoma, is better suited to conservation policies 
than the rule of absolute ownership. 
The correlative rights doctrine, a variant of the reasonable use theory, differs from 
reasonable use in three ways: ground water may not be used on non-overlying land; 
water stored underground (i.e., water taken from a stream and stored in underground 
spaces made free by removal of the ground water) may be used exclusively by the owner 
of the overlying land; and, in times of shortage, water is allocated proportionally to land 
owners according to the amount of property owned. The correlative rights doctrine is 
followed in its entirety only by the State of California. The proportional allocation aspect 
of the doctrine is followed by Nebraska and South Dakota. 
The prior appropriation doctrine invokes the use of a permit system. Permits for the 
use of ground water may be denied if the use of the water is deemed not to be "ben-
eficial," the use of the water would interfere with an existing right to the water, or the 
granting of the permit would contribute to an existing shortage of water in the area. The 
prior appropriation doctrine is followed by California (in part), Idaho, Kansas, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and 
Wyoming. Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917, 
923-27 (1980); see also, 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 17-19.4 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 
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that state.54 In the West, this means that water laws were de-
signed to promote the conservation of scarce resources.65 
What is now the western United States was once the "Great 
American Desert."66 The development of this area required a 
constant and substantial supply ofwater,67 and most of the West-
ern states responded by taking steps to retain "their" water for 
use within their states. These states enacted statutes to achieve 
this goal,68 and, in total, sixteen Western states69 have at some 
time restricted the exportation of water.70 
Statutes can restrict the export of water in varying degrees. 
California, in 1911, was the first state to enact a water embargo 
law, banning outright the export of water to another state.71 
Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico have since enacted similar 
statutes, later amended, which imposed an "absolute" embargo 
on water exports.72 A "discretionary" embargo, one which gives 
authority to a state administrative agency or the legislature to 
determine when water exports are permissible,13 first appeared in 
1921 with the enactment of a Montana statute prohibiting water 
exports without approval of the legislature.74 Since that date, 
discretionary embargo statutes were enacted in Nebraska, Ore-
64 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 4.1 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 
6S See generally id. at §§ 17-19.4. 
66 Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 641 
(1957). 
67 Id. 
66 See generally Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the 
Commerce Clause, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1249, 1251-53 (1981). 
69 In addition, the District of Columbia has enacted an embargo statute. See supra 
note 20. 
70 In addition to the fourteen statutes in force at the time of the Sporhase decision, see 
supra note 20, two states, California and Texas, enacted embargo statutes which were 
later repealed. See infra text and notes at notes 71, 75. For a discussion of the federal 
district court decision which lead to the repeal of the Texas statute, see infra, text and 
notes at notes 86-94. North Dakota is the only Western state never to have enacted an 
embargo statute. 
71 Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 104, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stat. 271 (repealed 1917). 
72 Act of Mar. 30, 1917, ch. 151, § 1, 1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 539 (current version at COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1980»; Act of Mar. 30, 1951, ch. 325, § 1, 1951 Nev. Stat. 543 
(current version at NEV. REV. STAT. 53.515, .520 (1979»; Act of Mar. 19, 1953, ch. 64, § 2, 
1953 N.M. Laws 108 (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978». See Note, 
supra note 68, at 1252. 
73 For a description of the Nebraska discretionary embargo statute, see infra text and 
notes at notes 98-101. 
74 Ch. 220, § 1, 1921 Mont. Laws (current version at MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 
(1979». 
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g'9n, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Texas.75 "Reciprocal" embargo 
statutes were first introduced by Arizona in 1919.76 Such statutes 
permit the transfer of water only to states from which water can 
be imported. In addition to Arizona, Washington, Idaho, Kansas, 
Utah, and South Dakota enacted reciprocal embargo statutes.77 
Although water anti-exportation statutes have taken various 
forms, they all raise the same question: to what degree may a 
state inhibit the flow of water in interstate commerce without 
running afoul of the commerce clause. It was not until eighty 
years after the enactment of the first embargo statute that the 
Court would thoroughly examine this issue in the Sporhase case.78 
This case did not, however, mark the first time that the issue had 
been before the Court. The following section will examine the two 
previous decisions in which the Supreme Court addressed 
whether water embargo statutes violate the commerce clause. 
B. Early Constitutional Challenges 
Prior to the Sporhase decision, the Supreme Court had twice 
addressed the constitutionality of state water embargo statutes. 
The Court's 1908 decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCar-
ter79 firmly established the right of the individual states to pre-
vent the export of its water. Almost fifty years later, however, the 
Court, in City of Altus v. Carr,so summarily affirmed a district 
75 Act of May 19, 1953, ch. 161, § 1, 1953 Neb. Laws 504 (current version at NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978»; Act of May 2, 1957, ch. 23, § 2(b), 1957 Okla. Sess. Laws 544, 545 
(current version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1085.2.2 (West 1981»; Act of May 12, 1951, ch. 593, 
§ 1,1951 Or. Laws 1053 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1979»; Act of Aug. 
30, 1965, ch. 568, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1245 (repealed by Act of Apr. 12, 1971, ch. 58, 1971 
Tex. Gen. Laws 658); Act of Feb. 25, 1939, ch. 125, § 1, 1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws 212 (current 
version at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-105 (1977». See Note, supra note 68, at 1252. 
76 Act of Mar. 26, 1919, ch. 164, § 15, 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws 278, 284 (current version at 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153B (1956)Xthe Arizona statute was later amended to 
become a discretionary statute. Note, supra note 68, at 1252 n.20). 
77 Act of Jan. 15, 1925, ch. 3, § 1, 1925 Idaho Sess. Laws 7 (current version at IDAHO 
CODE § 42-408 (1977»; Act of Mar. 4, 1976, ch. 435, § 1, 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws 1544 (current 
version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-726 (1977»; Act of Feb. 10, 1978, ch. 311, 1978 S.D. Sess. 
Laws 509 (current version at S.D. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1980»; Act of May 
13, 1941, ch. 96, § 1, 1941 Utah Laws 197 (current version at UTAH CoDE ANN. § 73-2-8 
(Supp. 1979»; Act of Mar. 16, 1921, ch. 103, § 31a, 1921 Wash. Laws 303, 305 (current 
version at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, .16.110, .16.120 (1962». The Nebraska 
reciprocal embargo provision, st~ck down in Sporhase, was an amendment to the 
original statute. See Neb. Laws 1967, ch. 281, § 5, p. 761; Neb. Laws 1969, ch. 9, § 69, p. 144. 
Note, supra note 68, at 1252 n.21. 
78 See infra text and note at note 56. 
79 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
80 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd memo 385 U.S. 35 (1966). 
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court opinion striking down an embargo statute as violative of the 
commerce clause. City of Altus raised questions as to the con-
tinued vitality of Hudson County. 
In Hudson County, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a New Jersey statuteS1 which prohibited the export of any 
surface water located within the state. The Court rejected a num-
ber of arguments that the statute was unconstitutional, including 
a claim that it violated the commerce clause.82 The majority opin-
ion by Justice Holmes briefly disposed of the commerce clause 
argument, relying on the common law concept of state ownership 
of natural resources.83 The Court held that the state owns all of 
the waters within its borders.84 It therefore had special authority 
to regulate water use in ways which it could not regulate the 
trade of articles which are privately owned.85 The New Jersey 
statute prohibiting the export of state-owned water did not, there-
fore, violate the commerce clause. 
The Supreme Court next considered the effect of the commerce 
clause on state water embargoes in City of Altus v. Carr.86 An-
ticipating future water shortages, the city of Altus, Oklahoma, 
contracted in November, 1964, to purchase ground water pumped 
from land located in Wicbarger County, Texas. In May, 1965, the 
Texas legislature approved a discretionary embargo statute 
which prohibited the exportation of ground water from Texas 
81 The New Jersey statute reads in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person or 
corporation to transport or carry ... the waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, 
creek, river, or stream of this State into any other State for use therein." N.J. Laws of 
1905, Chap. 238, p. 461, cited in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 353 
(1908). 
82 Plaintiff in error, who had been enjoined from fulfilling a contract with New York 
City to supply 3,000,000 gallons of water a day to the borough of Richmond from the 
Passaic River, argued that the statute violated the commerce clause, impaired obligation 
of contracts, took property without due process, and denied equal protection. Hudson 
County, 209 U.S. at 350-52. 
83 The state ownership theory places ownership of all natural resources not yet "cap-
tured" by an individual with the state, not with the individual landowner on whose 
property the resource lies. See infra text and notes at notes 210-234. 
84 The court relied throughout its opinion on its earlier decision in Geer v. Connecticut, 
in which the Court developed and fully adopted the theory that the states own the 
natural resources within their borders. See infra text and notes at notes 213-221. 
85 The Court stated that "[a] man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to 
use it in commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his otherwise limited and 
qualified right to the same end." Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357. Although the words of 
the Court are somewhat vague, the Court's citation to its earlier decision in Geer v. 
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), makes it clear that the Court is referring to the concept 
of state ownership. See infra text and notes at notes 213-221. 
86 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), afi'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966). 
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wells without the express approval of the legislature.87 The stat-
ute prevented fulfillment of the contract, and the city of Altus 
brought suit in federal district court challenging the Texas stat-
ute as violative of the commerce clause. The District Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas found that the water embargo did place 
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce, and in City of 
Altus,88 the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the decision 
of the lower court. 
In City of Altus, the district court had distinguished the Texas 
statute from the New Jersey law upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Hudson County by noting the difference between New Jersey and 
Texas water law.89 In New Jersey, the individual did not own the 
surface water flowing though his land, and therefore his rights to 
the use of the water were greatly limited.90 Texas, however, had 
adopted the doctrine of absolute ownership91 of ground water 
under which a landowner could use or sell all of the ground water 
he could extract from his land.92 There was, therefore, no state 
ownership of Texas ground water. Rather, unlike the New Jersey 
statute, the Texas embargo statute operated to restrict the inter-
state movement of something which was privately owned, and 
therefore was an article of commerce. The district court concluded 
that Hudson County was therefore not controlling, and that the 
Texas statute impermissibly restricted the export of an article of 
commerce.93 
Finally, the district court in City of Altus found that the alleged 
statutory purpose, water conservation, was not advanced by the 
Texas scheme, given the incongruous policy of permitting the 
87 The statute read, in full: 
No one shall withdraw water from any underground source in this State for use 
in any other state by drilling. a well in Texas and transporting the water outside 
the boundaries of the State unless the same be specifically authorized by an act 
of the Texas legislature and thereafter as approved by it. 
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 74776 (Vernon Supp. 1965), cited in City of Altus, 255 F. 
Supp. at 830 . 
.. City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), afl'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966). 
89 [d. at 839-40. 
110 New Jersey followed a limited riparian water law system for the appropriation of 
surface waters, under which a landowner could divert water only a reasonable distance 
from a stream, and could only use the water for "well-known ordinary uses." The 
landowner was also restricted in the amount he could appropriate. Hudson County, 209 
U.S. at 354. 
91 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955). 
92 See supra note 63. 
93 255 F. Supp. at 839-40. 
1985] WATER: ARTICLE OF COMMERCE 117 
unrestricted intrastate trade of Texas ground water. The court 
concluded that the purpose of the statute was to discriminate 
against non-Texans, and that it constituted an unreasonable bur-
den on interstate commerce.94 
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the district 
court's opinion in City of Altus was of little precedential value, 
indicating agreement with the result, but not necessarily the full 
reasoning of the lower court opinion.95 In either case, by its own 
logic, the reasoning of the Texas District Court in City of Altus 
would not necessarily be applicable in a state like New Jersey 
which allowed its citizens only a limited property interest in 
water.96 The district court in City of Altus expressly relied on the 
absolute ownership of ground water by Texas citizens to reach its 
result. As a result, City of Altus did not lead to the invalidation of 
any additional water embargo statutes. It did, however, leave the 
continued vitality of the statutes in doubt by indicating that the 
Supreme Court could later expressly find that water embargoes 
violate the principles of interstate commerce embodied in the 
commerce clause. The questions raised by City of Altus remained 
unanswered until the Supreme Court's decision in Sporhase, six 
years later. In Sporhase, the Court completed the reversal of 
Hudson County which it had begun in City of Altus. 
IV. THE SPORHASE DECISION 
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of a trial court injunction prohib-
iting the export of ground water from Nebraska pursuant to the 
Nebraska embargo statute. The trial court had enjoined Joy 
Sporhase and Delmar Moss from pumping water without a per-
mit97 from their well in Chase County, Nebraska, for use on a 
contiguous tract of land which they owned in Phillips County, 
Colorado. 
94 [d. at 840. 
95 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 949 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,453 U.S. 490, 
499 (1981». 
96 Texas, in fact, is the only Western arid or semi-arid state which grants to its citizens 
a right of absolute ownership in water. See supra note 63. 
97 Had the defendants applied for a permit, their request would have been denied, 
because of the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska embargo statute. Under existing 
Colorado law, no water exports were permitted. See infra note 153. Thus, the Nebraska 
reciprocity provision prohibited water exports to Colorado. See infra text and notes at 
notes 99, 153. 
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The issue before the Supreme Court in Sporhase was whether 
Nebraska could continue to discriminate against non-residents in 
the distribution of water supplies by restricting or prohibiting its 
export, or whether the water embargo statute constituted an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. In order to balance 
the state and the federal interests affected by the Nebraska 
embargo statute, the Court considered several factors, including 
the degree to which the state law restricted water exports, and 
the role of state water law in determining whether federal com-
mercial interests are implicated by the embargo statute. 
A. Nebraska Water Law 
The Nebraska statute challenged by the appellants in Sporhase 
was not the most restrictive of the embargo statutes.98 Ground 
water exports were not absolutely prohibited by Nebraska law, 
but under the embargo statute, a landowner was required to 
obtain the approval of the State Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) before ground water withdrawn in Nebraska could be used 
in another state. A permit would be granted if the requested 
withdrawal was reasonable, consistent with conservation policies, 
and not detrimental to the public welfare.99 In addition, the stat-
ute contained a reciprocal embargo provision by which water 
could be exported only to states which permitted ground water 
transfers to Nebraska.lOo A landowner who failed to obtain a 
permit could be prosecuted and held subject to a fine, and/or 
ground water withdrawals could be enjoined until a permit was 
obtained. 101 
Relative to landowners of other states, a Nebraska landowner is 
fairly restricted in his rights to use water situated on his land. 102 
98 Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico, for example, all had statutes at the time which 
functioned as absolute embargoes on the export of water. See supra note 72. 
99 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.10 (Reissue 1978). The statute reads: 
Any person ... intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit located 
in the state of Nebraska and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply 
to the department of water resources for a permit to do so. If the Director of 
Water Resources finds that the withdrawal of the ground water requested is 
reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is 
not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the 
state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and 
transport ground water from that state for use in the State of Nebraska. 
100 Id. 
101 NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.02 (Reissue 1978). 
102 For a thorough description of Nebraska ground water law, see generaUy Aiken, 
supra note 63. 
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In Texas, for example, a landowner has absolute ownership of all 
waters on or under his land.1°O The Nebraska Constitution, how-
ever, states that water is "dedicated to the people of the state for 
beneficial purposes," thereby indicating that there is no private 
ownership of water, just a right to use the water under or on one's 
land.104 In addition, the Supreme Court of Nebraska has expressly 
rejected the absolute ownership doctrine in favor of a more re-
strictive hybrid rule containing elements of both the "reasonable 
use"l05 and "correlative rights"l06 doctrines. A landowner may 
withdraw water only if it is to be used on the overlaying land, and 
only if its use is "reasonable." Under the correlative rights aspect 
of the Nebraska rule, in the event of a water shortage, each user 
of the water must share with other users. 107 
The Nebraska landowner's water rights were thus strictly lim-
ited. It could be argued, therefore, that like the New Jersey stat-
ute upheld in Hudson County/os the Nebraska statute did not 
burden interstate commerce. Arguably, as the Supreme Court 
had held in Hudson County, because the water was publicly, not 
privately owned, such a scheme would not even regulate an arti-
cle of commerce. Indeed, in State v. Sporhase,l09 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court adopted the latter proposition: that the Nebraska 
embargo statute did not impermissibly burden commerce, be-
cause it did not even regulate an article of commerce. 
B . Nebraska Supreme Court Decision 
In State v. Sporhase, appellants Sporhase and Moss argued 
that under City of Altus v. Carr, the Nebraska embargo statute 
ran afoul of the commerce clause. The state defended on the basis 
that, according to Nebraska ground water law, water belongs to 
the public, and is, therefore, not an article of commerce. In State v. 
Sporhase, the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed, affirming the 
trial court's order enjoining the defendants from irrigating their 
Colorado land with Nebraska waterYo 
103 See supra note 63. 
104 NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 4. See Comment, supra note 55, at 10084. 
106 See supra note 63. 
100 Id. 
107 See also Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. I, 5-7, 261 N.W. 2d 766 (1978); Metropolitan 
UtiI. Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, BOO-01, 104 N.W.2d 626 (1966); State ex reI. 
Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 705, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981). 
UI8 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See supra text and notes at notes 79-85. 
109 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981). 
110 208 Neb. at 712, 305 N.W.2d at 620. 
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The court reviewed Nebraska ground water law and concluded 
that "[n]either the courts nor the Legislature of Nebraska have 
considered Nebraska ground water as an article of commerce."111 
The court therefore distinguished City of Altus by pointing out 
that while under Texas law, ground water was an article of com-
merce, Nebraska ground water could not be freely traded intra-
state, and was therefore not an article of commerce. The decision 
in City of Altus was thus determined not to be controlling.112 The 
court found, on the other hand, that the Supreme Court's earlier 
decision in Hudsort County upholding the New Jersey embargo 
statute was controlling. The court found that because the district 
court in City of Altus struck down the Texas statute by distin-
guishing Hudson County,113 the Supreme Court's summa-
ry affirmance of City of Altus left the Hudson County decision 
intact. Ultimately, the court found that a state may, under its 
police powers, limit the export of its ground water without violat-
ing the commerce clause.114 
The Nebraska Supreme Court also distinguished the Supreme 
Court's decisions limiting a state's authority to export other 
natural resources, such as natural gas 115 and minnows,116 which 
could be reduced to private possession and freely traded.1l7 Unlike 
Nebraska ground water, therefore, natural gas and minnows 
were not removed from the stream of commerce by state regula-
tion and ownership. The Nebraska court also distinguished water 
from natural resources such as natural gas and minnows by 
finding that water is "the only natural resource absolutely essen-
tial to human survival."118 Thus, the court concluded that because 
water is unique, in the way it is regulated and in its importance, 
restrictions on its trade are not subject to the same commerce 
clause limitations imposed on the regulation of other natural 
resources. 
The Nebraska Chief Justice dissented in part, arguing that the 
reciprocity provision of the Nebraska decision was unconstitu-
111 ld. at 707, 305 N.W.2d at 618. 
112 ld. at 708-09, 305 N.W.2d at 618. 
113 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
114 208 Neb. at 709-10, 305 N.W.2d at 619. 
115 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 
221 U.S. 229 (1911). 
116 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
117 208 Neb. at 709-10, 305 N.W.2d at 619. 
118 ld. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619. 
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tional. The issue, in the Chief Justice's opinion, was whether a 
citizen could be prohibited from transferring water interstate 
solely because the recipient state barred exports to Nebraska. 
The Chief Justice claimed that the provision violated the com-
merce clause because it was unrelated to the reasonableness of 
the export or any conservation policy.119 Although the Chief Jus-
tice stood alone in his dissent, his reasoning and conclusion would 
reappear later in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. 
C. United States Supreme Court Decision 
In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. DO'Uf}las/20 the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Nebraska Supreme 
Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Stevens. The Court viewed 
the case as presenting two major issues. First, it had to determine 
whether Nebraska ground water was an article of commerce. If 
so, the Nebraska statute would be subject to commerce clause 
analysis. Second, if water embargo statutes were found to fall 
within the purview of the commerce clause, the Court would then 
have to determine whether the Nebraska statute unreasonably 
burdened interstate commerce. 121 
The State presented several arguments as to why its embargo 
statute did not in any way regulate commerce, and therefore 
could not be found to violate the commerce clause. The State 
argued that the Court's earlier decision in Hudson County was 
controlling, and, in addition, that Nebraska ground water should 
not be subjected to the same commerce clause scrutiny as other 
natural resources. Before examining the degree to which the 
Nebraska statute burdened interstate commerce, the Court first 
rejected the State's initial arguments that its embargo statute did 
not implicate the commerce clause. 
1. Water as an Article of Commerce 
The appellant Sporhase argued that City of Altus v. Carr was 
controlling, and that the Court should therefore find that, like the 
Texas statute in that case, the Nebraska embargo statute vio-
lated the commerce clause. l22 In response the Court initially noted 
119 [d. at 712-14, 305 N.W.2d at 620-21 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting). 
120 458 U.S. 941 (1982). 
121 See infra text and notes at notes 49-51. 
122 458 U.S. at 947. 
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that its summary affirmance in City of Altus was not binding. 
First, the affirmance indicated agreement only with the result 
reached by the lower court, not necessarily the rationale behind 
it. l23 Second, the Court distinguished City of Altus by pointing out 
that because of state ground water laws, landowners in Texas had 
a much greater property interest in water under their land than 
did landowners in Nebraska. l24 According to the Supreme Court, 
the district court in City of Altus had, therefore, properly found 
Texas ground water to be an article of commerce.125 Nebraska 
ground water, however, was distinguishable. 
The Court also held, however, that its earlier decision in Hud-
son Caunty was not controlling. Hudson Caunty relied on the 
concept of state ownership of natural resources expressed in Geer 
v. Connecticut to uphold the New Jersey water embargo statute 
against a commerce clause challenge.126 Geer, however, had been 
expressly overruled by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Okla-
homa. 127 In Hughes, the Court held that the state did not have a 
proprietary interest in natural reSources under the state own-
ership theory. Rather, the theory indicated only that the state 
had a strong interest in conservation and preservation, giving 
rise to police powers necessary to regulate the use of natural 
resources.128 The state ownership theory could not, therefore, be 
advanced for the proposition that a resource "owned" by the state 
was per se not an article of commerce. 129 
The Court was thus unpersuaded by the state's argument that 
because the Nebraska landowner possesses only a minimal own-
ership interest in ground water, Nebraska ground water is not an 
article of commerce. The Court held that this argument is based 
on the "fiction" of state ownership, noting that Nebraska water is 
freely transported from rural to urban areas under municipal 
water supply arrangements. l30 According to the Supreme Court, 
123 Id. at 949 (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 499 (1981». 
124 Id.; see supra text and notes at notes 89-93, 111-12. 
125 458 U.S. at 949-50. 
126 458 U.S. at 950; (citing Hudson County v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908». 
127 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1978); see infra text and notes at notes 227-34. 
128 458 U.S. at 951 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334, quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402. 
129 Cf 458 U.S. at 951. 
130 Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court had distinguished municipal water supply ar-
rangements by finding that the water is sold at a price equal to the cost of distribution, 
which did not reflect the value of the water itself, and that therefore it was not really 
being sold in commerce. State v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. at 708, 305 N.W.2d at 618 (1981). The 
Supreme Court, however, dismissed this argument, finding that the rate structure was 
just price regulation. 458 U.S. at 951-52. 
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Nebraska ground water law, therefore, did not determine 
whether Nebraska ground water was an article of commerce. 
The Court also rejected the reasoning of the Nebraska Supreme 
Court that water should be excluded from the scope of the com-
merce clause because it is the only natural resource necessary for 
human survival. 131 More important to the Court was that water 
plays a significant role in interstate commerce.132 To remove its 
regulation from the restrictions of the commerce clause, the Court 
held, would effectively allow Nebraska to impermissibly regulate 
commerce which is interstate. This would also prohibit Congress 
from exercising its affirmative powers to regulate commerce 
among the states-a power which the Court emphatically be-
lieved to encompass interstate water transfers. l33 
Finally, the Court rejected the State's contention that Congress 
had exempted state regulation of water from commerce clause 
restrictions l34 by its repeated deferral to state water law when 
enacting federal water projects and similar legislation,135 and by its 
131 See Brief of Appellee at 12, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) [hereinafter 
cited as Brief of Appellee]. 
132 The Court observed that 81% of U.S. water supplies are used for agriculture, and 
that sources of water such as the Ogallala Aquifer, which underlies appellant's land, 
transverse many state lines; these facts, in the Court's view, pointed out the significant 
role which ground water plays in interstate commerce. 458 U.S. at 953. 
133 458 U.S. at 953 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-23 (1978». In 
striking down a New Jersey statute which prohibited the importation of most types of 
wastes, the Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey held that to find that the 
transportation of valueless waste across state lines did not involve commerce would be to 
preclude Congressional regulation. In the Court's view, what is not commerce for pur-
poses of state regulation may not be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
Yet, "[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded 
by definition at the outset ... just as Congress has the power to regulate the interstate 
movement of these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they 
restrict that movement." 437 U.S. at 621-23. 
134 The State urged that where "Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate 
an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope of 
congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge." 
Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 21 (citing Wester and Southern Life Insurance Co. v. 
State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). 
135 The State noted that in 37 federal statutes Congress deferred to state water law in 
implementing federal policies. For example, Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 
states that "nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to 
in any way interfere with the laws of any State or territory relating to the control, 
appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right ac-
quired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of 
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws ... " Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, 
at 23 (quoting June 17, 1902 ch. 1098 § 8, 32 stat. 390, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1982». 
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approval of interstate water compacts. l36 The Court held that a 
valid exemption must be "expressly stated."l37 
Thus, having determined that the state ownership theory no 
longer provided unique authority to a state to regulate its natural 
resources, that water plays a significant role in interstate com-
merce, and that Congress had not exempted water from the scope 
of the commerce clause, the Court concluded that water is an 
article of commerce. State regulations which affect the interstate 
movement of water, therefore, are subject to commerce clause 
restrictions. 
2. The Burdens to Benefits Test 
Having concluded that water is an article of commerce, the 
Court went on to consider whether the Nebraska statute imper-
missibly burdened interstate commerce. Under the test sum-
marized by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. ,138 the 
Court first determines whether the alleged purpose of the statute 
is legitimate. Second, it examines whether the statute effectuates 
the alleged purpose. Third, the Court determines whether the 
statute effectuates the purpose in an "evenhanded" manner 
which does not discriminate against non-residents. If the statute 
meets this three-part test, it would be upheld unless the burden 
on commerce is "clearly excessive" in relation to the local benefits 
flowing from the statute. l39 
The Court began by looking closely at the Nebraska statute. 
The statute comprised four separate requirements-that the 
water export 1) is reasonable, 2) is consistent with conservation 
policies, 3) is not detrimental to the public welfare, and 4) does not 
divert water to a state which does not permit water exports to 
Nebraskal40 (the reciprocal embargo provision). Assuming that 
138 Under Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution, Congressional ap-
proval of all interstate compacts is required. "No State shall, without the consent of 
Congress ... enter into agreement or compact with another state ... " U.S. CONST. art. I., 
§ 10, cl. 3. The State argued that by approving at least 23 interstate water compacts, 
including two compacts between Colorado and Nebraska involving water near Appel-
lants' land, Congress had specifically deferred to the states in interstate water matters. 
Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 25-27. 
137 458 U.S. at 961 (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 
343 (1982), quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946». 
138 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
139 See supra text and notes at notes 46-51. 
140 See supra text and notes at notes 98-101. 
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the first element of the Pike test was satisfied-that the purpose 
of the statute as a whole was legitimate-each requirement of the 
Nebraska statute would be given separate scrutiny under each of 
the remaining elements of the Pike test. 
The Court first determined that the purpose of the statute, 
water conservation, was not only "legitimate," but also "highly 
important" and "genuine."I41 Second, it was found that the goal of 
conservation was promoted by the first three requirements of the 
statute-that the transfer be reasonable, not contrary to conver-
sation goals and not otherwise detrimental to the public wel-
fare. l42 The Court also found that the first three requirements did 
not violate the "evenhandedness" element of the Pike test. Al-
though the statute applied only to interstate transfers, the Court 
held these provisions to be "evenhanded" because of the strict 
limits on intrastate transfers. 143 
Finally, the Court found the first three requirements of the 
statute to be reasonable in weighing the local benefits against the 
statute's burdens on interstate commerce. Here, several factors 
were found to weigh in favor of a limited discrimination against 
non-residents, although the Court had earlier found these factors 
insufficient to remove entirely embargo statutes from the scope of 
the commerce clause. 144 First, a state may, under its police powers, 
regulate the use of water in order to promote the health and 
safety of its citizens. l45 Second, both the Congress and the Su-
141 458 U.S. at 954-55. The Court observed that Applicant's land was located within a 
"critical" township, and was thus subject to strict user regulations, including ceilings on 
the amount of water which may be used for irrigation, well spacing requirements, and 
start limits on intrastate water transfers. [d. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. 
144 All of the factors were considered by the court in determining whether water was 
an article of commerce, except the "publicly produced" argument, which was not ad-
vanced by the State. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 131. Such an argument, however, 
could have been made by the State. See infra text and notes at notes 306-08. The Court's 
consideration of whether the other three factors exempt water embargoes from com-
merce clause limitations is discussed supra, text and notes at notes 126-37. 
145 458 u.s. at 956. The Court noted that it has always distinguished health and safety 
regulation from economic protectionism. "This distinction between the power of the 
State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety ... and its lack of power 
to retard, burden or constrict the flow of ... commerce for their economic advantage, is 
one deeply rooted in both our history and our law." (H.P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 336 
U.S. 525, 533 (1949» (holding that New York could not deny a Massachusetts company a 
license to construct a milk processing facility because it would adversely affect New York 
milk producers.) 
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preme Court had sanctioned state restrictions on water exports 
through devices such as interstate compactsl46 and equitable ap-
portionment decrees. 147 Thus, the Court admitted that state 
boundaries are relevant in the determination of water rights. 
Third, because Nebraska ground water does possess qualities of 
public ownership, Nebraska citizens may be given a limited pref-
erence in its distribution. l48 Finally, because of the State's conser-
vation efforts, Nebraska ground water possesses some indicia of 
being publicly produced, which also justifies discriminating 
against non-residents in the distribution of this limited resource. 149 
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the first three re-
quirements of the statute-that the transfer be reasonable, con-
sistent with conservation goals, and not detrimental to the public 
welfare-are reasonable. 150 
While the first three requirements of the Nebraska statute 
were upheld, the reciprocity provision did not fare as well. This 
provision, barring exports to states which prohibited exports to 
Nebraska/51 had been determined to violate the commerce clause 
by the dissenting Nebraska Chief Justice in State v. SporhaseY>2 
146 458 u.s. at 956. Interstate water compacts are binding agreements between states 
establishing the water rights of each as to interstate waters. Congressional approval of 
interstate water compacts has been granted in at least 23 cases. See supra note 136. The 
Supreme Court has advocated the use of compacts to resolve interstate water disputes. 
See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943); see also 2 Waters and Water Rights, § 133 
(R. Clark ed. 1967). 
147 Equitable apportionment decrees arise out of decisions by the United States Su-
preme Court in which the Court apportions an interstate stream between two states by 
determining the amount which each may drain from the water each year. See 2 Waters 
and Water Rights, § 133 (R. Clark ed. 1967). 
148 458 U.S. 956 (citing Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978». In Hicklin, the 
Court considered the contitutionality of an Alaska statute requiring the Alaska resi-
dents be given hiring preference in the development of state-owned oil and gas fields 
under the privileges and immunities clause. The Court indicated that state ownership of 
resources justified some discrimination in favor of residents. (The Court held, however, 
that the Alaska statute exceeded the level of permissible discrimination). 437 U.S. at 
534. 
149 458 U.S. at 957. The Court has held that when a state itself acts as a participant in 
the marketplace, by selling its own resources or otherwise engaging in commerce in its 
own right, its activities may not implicate the commerce clause. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 
U.S. 429 (1980), in which the Court stated: "Nothing in the purposes animating the 
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of Congressional action, from par-
ticipating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." 
447 U.S. at 436 (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976»; see 
infra text and notes at notes 297-309 
150 458 U.S. at 957. 
151 See supra text and note at note 99. 
152 See supra text and note at note 119. 
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The Supreme Court determined that the reciprocity provision had 
to meet a stricter constitutional standard under the commerce 
clause. In the view of the Court, since Colorado forbade the 
export of its ground water,l53 the reciprocity requirement acted in 
this case as an explicit bar to water exports. The Court, therefore, 
concluded that such a statute was discriminatory on its face. 154 As 
a result, the State bore the burden of proving that the reciprocity 
provision was narrowly tailored to the asserted purpose of con-
servation, and that there were no adequate non-discriminatory 
alternatives. l55 Finding that the provision could prohibit the ex-
port of water from an area with abundant water supplies to an 
area in great need of water, the Court determined that the provi-
sion was not narrowly tailored to the purpose of conservation. 155 
The reciprocity provision did not, therefore, survive the Court's 
strict scrutiny and was struck down. The Court mentioned in 
dictum, however, that a provision, or even an outright ban by an 
especially arid state, might be justified if the state could establish 
a close fit between the ban and the goal of conservation. 157 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. The 
dissent noted that Congress may properly regulate activities hav-
ing an effect on interstate commerce which do not themselves 
directly involve articles of commerce.l58 It is thus unnecessary, 
said Justice Rehnquist, to determine either that water is an arti-
cle of commerce or that Congress may regulate it.159 The dissent 
153 COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-136 provides that "it is unlawful for any person to divert, 
carry, or transport by ditches, canals, pipelines, conduits, or any other manner any of the 
ground waters of this state, ... into any other state for use therein." Sporhase, 458 U.S. 
at 957 n. 17 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-136 (1973) (repealed 1983». 
154 458 U.S. at 957. The Court distinguishes those statutes which burden interstate 
commerce in effect from those which discriminate against non-residents or their face. 
The latter require strict scrutiny by the Court. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma., 441 U.S. 
322, 337 (1979); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). 
155 See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 
156 458 U.S. at 957-58. 
157 I d. at 958. 
158 Id. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 
316 U.S. 517 (1942) (Employees' maintenance of buildings whose tenants produced goods 
destined for commerce was also commerce, so that they were protected by the Fair 
Labor Standards Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (manufacturing goods 
destined for interstate commerce is commerce); Houston & Texas RR v. United States, 
234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Congress may regulate wholly intrastate rail transportation if 
necessary to regulate interstate transportation); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(Congress could limit wheat production for home consumption under the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act because the demand for wheat in commerce was subsequently de-
creased). 
159 458 U.S. at 961 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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also argued that because of the unique nature of water-its 
importance to the state and the way it is regulated-it was inap-
propriate for the Court to balance the State's interest against the 
burden on commerce under a traditional commerce clause ap-
proachY'o He pointed out that the Court in earlier decisions161 
established that a state has unique authority in its quasi-
sovereign capacity to regulate water in a manner that it would 
become commerce162-by denying landowners a right of own-
ership in water, and by forbidding its sale through the normal 
channels of commerce. The dissent concluded that because N e-
braska regulated ground water in a way that the landowner en-
joyed only a limited usufructuary right,1m the water does not 
enter the stream of commerce.164 Justice Rehnquist did not then 
go on to determine whether in this case interstate commerce was 
affected by the statute, but rather, concluded somewhat obliquely 
that because Nebraska ground water was not an article of inter-
state commerce, the Nebraska statute was a constitutional exer-
cise of Nebraska's police powers. l65 
Justice Rehnquist, therefore, believed that all water embargoes 
160 [d. at 962-63. 
161 The dissent cited Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), and Kansas 
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). In Georgia, the majority stated: 
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity as quasi-sovereign. In 
that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of 
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to 
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air. 
485 U.S. 962 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, quoting Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237) 
(holding that Georgia could enjoin Tennessee corporations from discharging pollutant 
air over Georgia's land). In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court held that a "State's quasi-
sovereign interest in the flow of ... water within its borders [is] of the same magnitude as 
its interest in pure air or healthy forests." Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 158 U.S. at 142, 145-46). 
162 458 U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
163 A usufructuary right is the right to enjoy a thing in which one does not have a 
property right. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (5th ed. 1979). 
164 458 U.S. at 964-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that: "Ne-
braska landowners do not have a right of absolute ownership of water; they are limited 
to reasonable and beneficial use; sharing water is required during periods of drought; 
they may not transfer water intrastate; and if in a "critical area," landowners are sub-
ject to additional irrigation and well placement restrictions." 
165 [d. at 965 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that if water is 
not an article of commerce then the Nebraska statute does not burden commerce is 
curious in light of his acknowledgment that "Congress may regulate not only the stream 
of commerce itself, but activities which affect interstate commerce ... " 458 U.S. at 961 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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were consistent with the requirements of the commerce clause, so 
long as the state regulates intrastate water rights in a manner 
that entirely removes water from the stream of commerce. Al-
though the majority differed with the dissent's position, which 
would uphold virtually all embargo statutes, the Court's opinion 
still leaves the states considerable authority to restrict the flow of 
water from its borders. In striking only the reciprocal embargo 
provision of the Nebraska statute, the Court appears to have 
recognized that a state's exceptional interest in preserving the 
water within its boundaries justifies some amount of discrimina-
tion against non-residents in its distribution. Exactly how much 
discrimination will be permitted is not entirely clear from the 
Court's opinion. 
D. The Impact of Sporhase 
1. The Effect of Sporhase on State Embargo Statutes 
The Sporhase opinion was much narrower than the sweeping 
decision anticipated and feared by Western water resource man-
agers. Many were concerned that the Supreme Court was pre-
pared to end two centuries of state primacy over ground water. HiS 
The opinion, in fact, left the states considerable authority over 
ground water regulation. 167 The Court, however, was emphatic in 
its belief that ground water is properly a subject for Con-
gressional regulation under the commerce clause, HiS and thus 
found it necessary to hold that ground water is an article of 
commerce.169 Nevertheless, the Court also exhibited great reluc-
tance to cut very deeply into the states' power to regulate water170 
166 See Comment, supra note 55, at 10087. 
167 See generally, Sporhase v. Nebraska: Hearings on S. 1844 before the Subcommittee 
on Water Resources of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 97th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land 
and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice [hereinafter cited as Dinkins 
Statement]; Sporhase v. Nebraska: Hearings on S. 1844 Before the Subcommittee on 
Water Resources of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 97th. Cong., 
2nd Session (1982) (statement of Dr. Thomas Bahr, Director of the Office of Water Policy, 
Department of the Interior) [hereinafter cited as Bahr statement]; Comment, supra note 
55, at 10087. 
166 458 U.S. at 953-54. 
169 [d. 
170 The Court's decision appears to address both ground and surface waters. See P. 
Baldwin, Sporhase v. Nebraska 10 (July 27, 1982Xunpublished manuscript prepared for 
the American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress). 
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exports for conservation purposes, and if necessary, to regulate in 
such a manner that preference may be given to residents over 
non-residents. In upholding the first three requirements of the 
Nebraska statute-that the transfer be reasonable, consistent 
with conservation goals, and not detrimental to the public 
welfare, 171~the Court held that a state could continue to claim a 
property interest in its water. Although this in itself was in-
sufficient to remove the water from commerce clause restrictions, 
the holding justified export restrictions which discriminate 
against non-residents. l72 
The extent of the discrimination which will be permitted under 
the Sporhase decision, however, is unclear. Of the three types of 
water embargoes-absolute, discretionary, and reciprocaP73-
only discretionary embargoes retain any significant chance of 
surviving a commerce clause challenge. Only in extreme cases 
would absolute embargoes be upheld,174 and reciprocal embargoes 
would almost certainly never pass constitutional muster under 
the Court's decision in Sporhase. 
Like the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska statute, any 
absolute embargo on water exports would have to meet the strict 
scrutiny test imposed on commercial legislation which is discrim-
inatory on its face. 175 Thus, the state would have to establish that 
the embargo statute had a legitimate purpose, was narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose, and that there were no adequate 
non-discriminatory alternatives.176 As in Sporhase, it is the "nar-
row tailoring" requirement which would defeat most absolute 
embargoes. The Court noted that a sufficiently "close means-ends 
relationship"177 between an absolute embargo and statutory pur-
pose might exist in "a demonstrably arid state,"l78 suffering a 
"severe shortage."179 In addition, in order to successfully assert 
171 458 U.S. at 956. 
172 [d. 
173 See supra text and notes at notes 71-77. 
174 The Court in Sporhase struck down a reciprocity requirement, not an export ban. It 
treated the provision as if it were an outright prohibition on exports, however, because 
with regard to exports to Colorado, the provision did serve as a ban. This portion of the 
Court's opinion is therefore useful in determining how outright embargoes would be 
viewed by the Court. The Court also discussed in dictum under what circumstances 
absolute water embargoes could withstand a commerce clause challenge. 458 U.S. at 958. 
175 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 
178 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. 
177 458 U.S. at 958. 
178 [d. 
17" 4fi8 U.S. at 956. 
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conservation as the purpose of the embargo, the state would have 
to impose similarly severe restrictions on intrastate water use. 
This would not only help to establish a "close fit," but would be 
necessary to justify the "evenhandedness" requirement of the 
Pike testl80 as well. Third, a state with an absolute embargo would 
have to establish that the embargo was necessary for reason of 
health, not economy.181 The embargo of any water beyond that 
necessary for the survival and health of its citizens would un-
doubtedly be subjected to the same commerce clause standards as 
the embargo of any other natural resource, and struck down as 
economic protectionism. Finally, in order to save its water for its 
own citizens, the state would have to establish that it suffers a 
state-wide water shortage, and that the intrastate transport of 
water to arid areas was "feasible,"l82 i.e., the water would not be 
better used outside of the state. 
In the only decision since Sporhase to have considered the 
constitutionality of an embargo statute, the Federal District 
Court for the District of New Mexico applied these standards in 
striking down the New Mexico absolute embargo statute. 1~ In 
City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 184 the court found that the purpose of 
the New Mexico statute was not to protect the health of its 
citizens, but to preserve the embargoed water for intrastate eco-
nomic development. l85 In addition, the court held in dictum that 
even if the purpose of the statute was public health, the narrow 
tailoring requirement of the commerce clause test would not be 
met because "there [was] no present or imminent shortage of 
water in New Mexico for health and safety needs."l86 The court 
also held that the statute failed ~o meet the "evenhandedness" 
180 [d.; supra text and note at note 49. 
181 The Sporhase Court held that "a State's power to regulate the use of water in times 
and places of shortage for the purpose of the health of its citizens-and not simply the 
health of its economy-is at the core of its police power." 458 U.S. at 956. 
182 458 U.S. at 956. 
183 The statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978), contains a minor exception for the 
transportation of underground water by tank truck for use in oil and gas developments. 
184 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983). 
185 The court found that "the [Sporhase] Court held that a state may discriminate in 
favor of its citizens only to the extent that water is essential for human survival. Outside 
of fulfilling human survival needs, water is an economic resource. For purposes of 
constitutional analysis under the Commerce Clause, it is to be treated the same as other 
natural resources." 563 F. Supp. at 389. The court then found that the intra-state uses for 
which New Mexico was to preserve its water-including use by municipalities, industry, 
agriculture, etc.-were related to economic activities. [d. at 390. 
186 [d. 
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requirement of the Pike test because of the liberal rules for in-
state water use. 187 Finally, the district court narrowly construed 
the Supreme Court's requirement that the intrastate transporta-
tion of the embargoed water to dry areas be "feasible."I88 The 
court held that Sporhase mandates that the state have current 
plans to use the water in arid parts of the state/89 and that the 
plans be feasible, both from an engineering and an econamic 
standpoint, at that time. l90 Only then would an absolute embargo 
survive a commerce clause challenge. Failing to meet any of these 
tests, the New Mexico statute was struck down.wl 
The third type of embargo statute, prohibiting exports to a 
state which itself prohibits exports, will probably be eliminated 
entirely as a result of the Sporhase decision. Where a reciprocal 
embargo acts as an absolute embargo because the point of diver-
sion is within a state which did not permit water exports, the 
statute would be treated like an absolute embargo statute under 
commerce clause analysis. l92 In addition, the state would bear the 
additional burden of establishing that the reciprocity require-
ment bore a close means-ends relationship to the purpose of con-
servation. l93 This would almost certainly prevent any reciprocal 
embargo from surviving a commerce clause challenge. Since any 
reciprocity provision might serve to prevent the exportation of 
water from an area of abundance to one that is dry,l94 the "close 
fit" requirement might never be met. 
Thus, of the three types of embargo statutes, only discretionary 
embargoesl95 remain relatively safe from commerce clause chal-
lenge. Where the statute establishes standards to be followed by 
the permitting authority, like the first three provisions of the 
Nebraska statute upheld in Sporhase, the statute would be up-
held so long as: 1) the statutory criteria used were not barred by 
Congressional action; 196 2) it can be established that the standards 
effectuate a legitimate state purpose such as conservation;197 and 
181 I d. at 391. 
188 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958; see supra text and note at note 182. 
189 563 F. Supp. at 391. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 391-92. 
192 Cf Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957. 
193 Id. 
194 See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58. 
195 See supra text and notes at notes 73-75. 
196 Cf Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956. 
197 Id. at 954-55. 
1985] WATER: ARTICLE OF COMMERCE 133 
3) the statute regulates "evenhandedly" in that interstate trans-
fer requirements are not significantly more stringent than lim-
itations on intrastate water use. l98 Where total discretion is 
granted to the permitting authority,t99 presumably, the same 
standards would be applied to the criteria employed by the ad-
ministrator. 
The short-term effect of the Sporhase decision on state author-
ity over water exports might be described as significant but lim-
ited. A state's water can no longer be absolutely preserved for its 
own citizens beyond that necessary for public health. In uphold-
ing the discretionary embargo provisions of the Nebraska statute, 
however, the Court made it clear that the Western states' ex-
traordinary interests and competence in water conservation are 
factors to be considered in weighing the reasonableness of an 
embargo statute,2tlO and justify a limited discrimination against 
non-residents.201 The decision, however, not only restricted the 
states' authority over water rights, but also affirmed the Con-
gress' complete commerce powers over water. Federal domination 
in this area, therefore, is made possible by the Sporhase decision. 
It is unlikely, however, that Congress would fully exercise its 
authority in this area in the near future. 
2. The Effect of Sporhase on Federal Water Policy. 
The Sporhase decision clearly states that water is an article in 
interstate commerce which may be regulated by Congress.202 This 
being so, Congress presumably could bar all export restrictions, or 
even preempt entirely state water law.203 Several factors, how-
ever, work against the likelihood of this occurring in the near 
future. First, as pointed out by the appellee-state in Sporhase, 
Congress has in the past consistently deferred to the states in 
matters of water management.204 Although there is some move-
.98 ld. at 954, 956 . 
• 99 See e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-15-9, which grants total discretion in the State Water 
Resources Board. 
200 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953. 
20. ld. 
202 458 U.S. at 953-54. 
203 Under the Court's expansive view of "commerce," Congress may regulate even 
wholly intrastate activities which have an indirect impact on interstate commerce. See 
supra text and note at note 158. 
204 Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 22-25. Appellee argued that: "The history of the 
relationship between the Federal government and the States in the reclamation of the 
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ment in Congress toward recognizing that federal action may be 
necessary to cope with decreasing water supplies, there is no indi-
cation that this movement will not also embrace the concept of 
state sovereignty over water.205 The Reagan administration, in 
fact, has expressed opposition to the federal government's exercis-
ing its authority over water use, and strongly favors continued 
deference by the federal government to the states.206 
In addition, extensive federal regulation of individual water 
rights in the near future may be politically unfeasible. It is un-
likely that such a change would be approved by either house of 
Congress, particularly the Senate where the Western states rep-
resent a united and powerful voting block.207 Furthermore, given 
that water is one of the most sensitive political issues in the West, 
any presidential candidate would be very reluctant to endorse 
such legislation.208 
Thus, the impact of the Sporhase decision, both short and long-
term, is likely to be fairly limited. States retain considerable au-
thority to conserve water through restricting exports. In addition, 
Congressional authority to regulate water will probably remain 
largely untapped, at least in the near future. Only the reciprocity 
provision of the Nebraska statute was struck down, and the deci-
sion was generally supportive of the states' ability to conserve 
water resources by limiting exports. 
The question remains, however, whether the Court could have 
arid lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the 
consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Con-
gress." Id. at 22-23 (quoting California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)). 
205 See generally Rhodes, Developing a National Water Policy: Problems and Perspec-
tives on Reform, 8 J. LEGIS. 1 (1981). 
206 Dr. Thomas Bahr, Director of the Office of Water Policy of the Department of the 
Interior, has already testified that: 
[T]he Administration is strongly committed to state primacy on water issues. 
While some may view the Sporhase decision as an opening or pretext for an 
expanded Federal presence in ground water management, we reject such coun-
sel and will vigorously oppose efforts to intrude Federal authority into an area 
that shall continue to be reserved to the states. 
Bahr Statement, supra note 167. 
207 The Western Senators would likely be joined by many Southern members whose 
interests in States' rights often rise above all else. 
208 It should be noted that Congress could modify the Supreme Court's holding in 
Sporhase by limiting a state's vulnerability to commerce clause challenges of export 
bans. Legislation could be enacted which would either 1) establish guidelines as to what 
types of state export restriction were permissible, 2) authorize pursuant to the commerce 
clause all existing state export restrictions, or 3) spur the formation of interstate com-
pacts. See Dinkins Statement, supra note 167. 
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somehow found that a state should retain complete authority 
over the water within its borders. Specifically, some commen-
tators argue that by finding water to be an article of commerce, 
the Supreme Court in Spor/w,se failed to properly respect unique 
water interests in water resources.209 Accordingly, although the 
Court's commerce clause analysis clearly grants states consider-
able authority to discriminate against non-residents in the dis-
tribution of water, the question remains whether the state water 
statutes should be subjected to commerce clause restrictions at 
all. 
Many arguments can be made in support of the proposition that 
water is unique and should remain entirely within the states' 
control. Yet, only one, the state ownership argument, was really 
considered by the Court; and even in this regard, several impor-
tant questions raised by the state ownership argument were left 
unanswered. Most significantly, the Court failed to adequately 
explain the concept of state ownership, and why it fails to em-
power a state to impose greater burdens on the interstate trade of 
natural resources than other articles of commerce. 
The Spor/w,se Court's finding that water should be treated as 
an article of commerce may have been proper. Nevertheless, the 
degree to which the decision will aid future litigants and courts 
considering the constitutionality of state regulations of water and 
other natural resources is limited. The utility of Spor/w,se is ham-
pered by the failure of the Court to thoroughly consider many of 
the important issues raised by examining whether water is an 
article of commerce. Yet Sporhase will undoubtedly be relied upon 
not only to determine the constitutionality of all water embargo 
statutes, but all statutes designed to foster resource conservation, 
which also restrict interstate commerce. An examination of these 
issues not treated by the Court, or treated by the Court in a 
cursory manner, is therefore necessary. 
V. Is WATER DIFFERENT? POSSIBLE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
EXEMPTIONS 
At least five arguments can be advanced in support of the 
proposition that the regulation of water rights by the states 
should be exempt from commerce clause scrutiny. These include 
209 See e.g., Tarlock, So It's Not "Ours"-Why Can't We Still Keep It? A First Look at 
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 18 LAND & WATER LAW REV. 137 (1983). 
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arguments that: 1) the state ownership theory exempts water 
regulation from commerce clause restraints; 2) water is not an 
article of commerce; 3) states have exceptional police powers to 
regulate water; 4) the state is acting as a market participant, not 
a regulator, in allocating its water; and 5) the concept of state 
sovereignty prohibits federal regulation of individual water 
rights. Although some of the arguments raise significant issues 
unaddressed by the Sporhase Court, ultimately none is adequate 
to protect entirely water embargo statutes from commerce clause 
scrutiny. These arguments will now be examined in detail. 
A. The State Oumership Theory 
The state ownership argument takes two forms: first, it is ar-
gued that state ownership of water brings to the state special 
authority to regulate water use in a manner which might oth-
erwise violate the commerce clause;21o and second, because citizens 
lack a property interest in water and are forbidden from selling it 
in regular channels of commerce, water cannot be considered an 
article of commerce.211 
1. The Rise of the State Ownership Theory 
The roots of the state ownership theory can be traced back 
several centuries to the ancient common law of Western 
Europe.212 The theory was first fully adopted and applied in this 
country in the seminal case of Geer v. Connecticut.213 
In Geer, the defendant was convicted of attempting to export 
woodcock, ruffled grouse, and quail in violation of a Connecticut 
statute which forbade the export of game birds killed within the 
state.214 The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the Con-
necticut statute violated the commerce clause, because the state 
traditionally has had the authority to regulate the taking of wild 
animals.215 The Court examined at great length the ancient and 
210 See, e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See also supra, 
text and notes at notes 81-83. 
211 See, e.g., Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 12-15. 
212 See infra note 216. 
213 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
214 The statute reads (in full): "No person shall at any time kill any woodcock, ruffled 
grouse or quail for the purpose of conveying the same beyond the limits of this state; or 
shall transport or have in possession, with intent to procure the transportation beyond 
said limits, any of such birds killed within this state." ld. at 519 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 2546 (Revision of 1888». 
215 161 U.S. at 522. 
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feudal law approach to property rights in wild animals and 
natural resources, finding that,"the right to acquire animalsferae 
naturae by possession was recognized as being subject to the 
governmental authority and under its power, not only as a matter 
of regulation, but also of absolute control."216 The Court then 
found that this authority passed from England to the Colonies 
and from the Colonies to the States,217 and that the Connecticut 
statute was a legitimate attempt to conserve wild animals for use 
by Connecticut residents.218 The Court went on to reject the ar-
gument that because the State permitted the free trade of game 
birds intrastate, that the birds were articles of commerce pro-
tected in interstate trade by the commerce clause. The embargo 
statute was held to remove from the game the essential attributes 
of an article of commerce, including the freedom of contract and 
full ownership.219 
The breadth of the Geer decision indicated that the states had 
216 Id. at 523. The Court noted the observation of Pothier, author ofTRAITE DU DROITE 
DE PROPRIETE, that: 
[i]n France, as well as in all other civilized countries of Europe, the civil law has 
restrained the liberty which the pure law of nature gave to every one to capture 
animals who, being in naturali lexitate, belong to no person in particular. The 
sovereigns have reserved to themselves, and to those to whom they judge 
proper to transmit it, the right to hunt all game, and have forbidden hunting to 
other persons. 
Id. at 524 (quoting Pothier, TRAITE DU DROITE DE PROPRIETE, nos. 27-28.) The Napoleonic 
codes, articles 714 and 715, stated that "[t]here are things which belong to no one, and the 
use to which is common to all. Police regulations direct the manner in which they may be 
enjoyed. The faculty of hunting and fishing is also regulated by special laws." 161 U.S. at 
526. The 18th century legal philosopher Blackstone also observed that: 
... there are some few things which ... must still unavoidably remain in 
common, being such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of 
being had; and therefore they still belong to the first occupant during the time 
he holds possession of them and no longer. Such (among others) are the ele-
ments oflight, air and water, which a man may occupy by means of his windows, 
his gardens, his mill and other conveniences; and such are also the generality of 
those animals which are said to be ferae naturae. 
116 U.S. at 526 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *14). With regard to the 
regulation of the taking of game, Blackstone said that: 
[B]y the law of nature every man from the prince to the peasant has an equal 
right of pursuing and taking to his own use all such creatures as are ferae 
naturae . .. [b]ut it follows from the very end and constitution of society that this 
natural right as well as many others ... may be restrained by positive laws 
enacted for reasons of state or for the supposed benefit of the community. 
161 U.S. at 527 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410). 
217 161 U.S. at 527-28. 
218 Id. at 529. 
219 Id. at 530. 
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complete authority over all wild animals and other natural re-
sources.22O It was therefore appropriate for courts to rely on Geer 
in upholding state natural resource embargoes, as did the Su-
preme Court in Hudson County in dismissing the commerce 
clause challenge to the New Jersey water embargo statute.221 
2. The Demise of State Ownership 
Soon after the Geer decision, however, the Court began to cut 
back on the concept of state ownership. First, in West v. Kansas 
Natural Gas CO.,222 the Court found that the state ownership 
theory did not protect a state statute prohibiting the export of 
natural gas from a commerce clause attack. The decision greatly 
limited the applicability of the state ownership theory to natural 
resources.223 Then, in a series of decisions in which the extent of 
state authority over wild animals was considered, the Court con-
tinued to narrow the concept of state ownership.224 Eventually, 
220 See supra note 183. 
221 See supra text and notes at notes 79-85. 
222 221 U.S. 229 (1911). 
223 In West, the Court rejected an argument that under the state ownership theory, 
Oklahoma could prohibit the export of natural gas. The Court found that although 
natural gas did have some qualities of public ownership, Oklahoma could not allow its 
citizens to freely sell the resource intrastate while forbidding its trade in interstate 
commerce. The free intrastate trade of gas required that the Court treat Oklahoma gas 
as an article of commerce. The Court, however, distinguished natural gas from wild 
animals which, under Geer, could be barred from interstate commerce, even though they 
were freely traded intrastate. Gas was found to be less of a public property thanferae 
naturae because, while the latter could be possessed and owned by all, the former could 
be owned by the landowner only. The Court reasoned that the state's control decreased 
along with the level of public ownership of the resource. 
Concluding that the purpose behind the statute was regulation of commerce and not 
conservation, the Court held that such statutes are inconsistent with the concept of a 
national economy embodied in the commerce clause. The Court then distinguished this 
case from Hudson County v. McCarter, 109 U.S. 349 (1908), finding first, that unlike the 
regulation of natural gas, the preservation and regulation of water is one of the most 
important functions of government. Second, the Court found that landowners enjoyed 
only a limited property right in water, whereas Oklahoma gas was owned outright by the 
landowner. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). 
224 In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), decided 24 years after Geer, the Court 
upheld the authority of the United States to limit the hunting of certain migratory 
birds as authorized by legislation implementing a U.S.-Canadian treaty. In a decision by 
Justice Holmes, author of the Geer opinion, the Court rejected a tenth amendment 
challenge to the statute. The decision indicated that the concept of state ownership may 
not significantly enhance the police powers of the state. In the words of Justice Holmes, 
"[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not 
in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership." 252 U.S. at 
434. 
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the Court found the state ownership theory to be merely a "legal 
fiction" for the states' exceptional police powers over vital re-
sources.225 A state's claim of ownership would, therefore, be 
deemed insufficient to exempt an embargo statute from com-
merce clause scrutiny.226 . 
Finally, in 1979, the Court expressly overruled Geer, and in 
doing so dealt the final blow to the concept of state ownership, at 
least with respect to wild animals. In Hughes v. Oklahama,227 the 
Court found that a state statute which prohibited the export of 
minnows taken from state waters violated the commerce 
clause.228 After tracing the gradual erosion of the Geer decision,229 
In Foster-Fountain Packing Co., Inc. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928), the Supreme Court 
held that a claim of state ownership did not protect a Louisiana statute which allowed 
the free trade of shrimp within Louisiana, but prohibited their export until the head and 
tail had been removed. The Court looked beyond the apparently broad authority over 
natural resources given to the states by Geer, and examined the actual purpose of the 
statute, as well as the possessory rights of Louisiana citizens over shrimp. The Court 
first held that because Louisiana citizens could eventually export all captured shrimp, 
the real purpose of the statute was not to conserve the resource, as claimed by the State, 
but to ensure that the shrimp were processed within the state-an impermissible 
objective under the commerce clause. In addition, the Court held that because the State 
did permit the interstate trade of all parts of the shrimp after processing, it released its 
claim to ownership or trusteeship of the shrimp, which was effectively transferred to the 
citizen and perfected when the shrimp was captured. [d. 
The state ownership theory received an even greater blow from the Court's decision in 
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In Witsell, the Court made clear that a state's 
special authority over its natural resources would no longer in itself justify burdens on 
interstate trade. In striking down several South Carolina statutes which limited non-
residents' rights to fish in South Carolina waters, the Court held that: 
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have 
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource and 
there is no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and the 
constitutional command that the State exercise that power, like its other pow-
ers, so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of other States. 
[d. at 402. More recently, the Court elaborated on WitseU, holding pragmatically that: 
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game 
preserve and it is pure fanatasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. 
Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful 
fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to 
possession by skillful capture. 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). 
225 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948). 
226 [d. 
227 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
228 [d. at 323-24 n.1 (citing OKL. STAT, tit. 29, § 4-115(13». The statute reads in relevant 
part: "No person may transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were 
seined or procured within the waters of this state .... " 
229 441 U.S. 329-35. 
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the Court held that state regulations of wild animals which bur-
den interstate commerce should be evaluated according to the 
standards applied to regulations burdening the trade of other 
natural resources.230 The Court applied the Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc. balancing test to determine whether the statute violated the 
commerce clause.231 Finding the statute to be facially discrimina-
tory,232 the Court rejected the argument that the statute was a 
legitimate effort to conserve natural resources. The Court held 
that state ownership could no longer be advanced to justify dis-
criminating against non-residents in the name of conservation 
when non-discriminatory alternatives are available.233 Wild ani-
mals after Hughes, like natural gas after West v. Kansas Natural 
Gas CO.,234 would no longer be excluded by the Court from the 
commerce clause simply by virtue of a state's claim to ownership. 
Any regulation impeding their free trade in commerce would 
therefore be subject to commerce clause analysis. 
By expressly overruling Geer, the Court precluded any argu-
ment that a state could restrict the flow in commerce of a natural 
resource found within its borders simply by virtue of its asserted 
claim of ownership. The impact of the decision would, therefore, 
extend beyond state regulation of wild animals. State authority to 
regulate any natural resource would be undermined where that 
authority is grounded in an asserted claim of ownership. 
3. The Supreme Court's Analysis of State Ownership in Sporhase 
The Hughes Court had reversed Geer because it viewed the 
concept of state ownership as a "19th century legal fiction."235 
Certainly, this holding was consistent with the Court's earlier 
decisions which cut back on the concept of state ownership.236 In 
no case since Geer, however, had the Court fully examined what is 
implied by the concept of state ownership; why it is more of a 
230 The Hughes Court cited as the appropriate test those standards enunciated in West 
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), discussed supra at note 223, and the 
traditional balancing test stated by the Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 
142 (1970). See supra text and notes at notes 46-51. 
231 397 U.S. at 142. 
232 141 U.S. at 336-37. 
233 [d. at 337. 
234 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See supra note 190. 
235 441 U.S. at 337. 
236 See supra note 224. 
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"legal fiction" than any other form of ownership;237 or why the 
assumption that the state ownership theory is a "legal fiction" 
reduces a state's authority over that which it purports to own. 
Yet, without examining the meaning of state ownership or the 
reasons for its demise, the Supreme Court in Sporhase rejected 
the argument that the state ownership was sufficient to defend 
an embargo statute against a commerce clause challenge.238 A 
closer look at the concept of state ownership is therefore neces-
sary to evaluate the Court's analysis of the state ownership ar-
gument, and to determine whether a state ownership claim 
should remove water from the scope of the commerce clause. 
Professor Frank Trelease, a noted commentator in the field, has 
observed that governmental conflicts over water cannot be re-
solved by reference to concepts of ownership.239 According to pro-
fessor Trelease, "[o]wnership is not a thing in itself, but a conve-
nient word tool used to express a number of ideas ... [I]t has no 
independent meaning aside from that which we put into it."240 In 
sum, the term "ownership" is shorthand for the legal rights which 
one has over the thing owned, and in itself confers no authority.241 
One who claims ownership of a watch, for example, does not have 
the right to sell it, recover for its conversion, or donate it by gift or 
devise simply because one "owns" it-this is a tautology. Rather, 
the "owner" has these rights because he bought the watch (or it 
was given to him, he inherited it, etc.). His claim of ownership is 
shorthand for the various legal rights he has which flow from his 
purchase of the watch.242 
The same analysis applies to state "ownership" of water. As 
stated by Professor Trelease: 
State ownership means that the state has power to control 
the allocation of water rights by permits, that the state may 
237 The most substantial reason given by a court since Geer why state ownership of 
natural resources is more of a "fiction" than other forms of ownership was that provided 
by the Court in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977). See supra note 
224. 
238 Nebraska did not argue that solely because it claims ownership of its water, its 
embargo statute was exempt from commerce clause restrictions. The state did argue, 
however, that Hudson County was controlling. Hudson County relied on the concept of 
state ownership to reject the commerce clause challenge to the New Jersey embargo 
statute. Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357. 
239 See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship oj Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638 
(1957). 
240 I d. at 639. 
241 Id. 
242 I d. at 638-39. 
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adjudicate rights among appropriators, that it may take an 
active part in seeing that the water laws are obeyed, and that 
it may enact forfeiture laws. Why does it means this? Be-
cause we use the words to express the complex of these legal 
consequences of the fact that the state is the organization set 
up to regulate and control the allocation of scarce things 
among the people.243 
Ownership, therefore, cannot be a starting point in determining 
what rights a state has over the water within its borders. The 
ownership analysis is particularly troublesome here because gov-
ernment ownership is not the same as private ownership.244 The 
source of the authority and the rights which comprise right of 
"ownership" are different.245 
Property concepts are therefore of little value in establishing 
the rights of individual landowners, states, and the federal gov-
ernment over water.246 Rather, the appropriate question in de-
termining whether the states or the federal government have 
authority over a particular source of water is not who owns the 
water, but which governmental body has the power to regulate 
that water, and whether the exercise of that power is appropri-
ate.247 In fact, the Court has in the past resolved disputes over 
water not by resorting to concerns of property and ownership, but 
by focusing on "the question of the allocation of sovereign power 
among the units of a federated government."248 
Under this analysis, the Sporhase court was correct in rejecting 
the assertion by the state that a simple claim to ownership is in 
itself sufficient to remove water embargoes from the purview of 
the commerce clause. A claim of state ownership is meaningless 
without an analysis of the powers which lie behind the claim. In 
determining the constitutionality of the embargo statutes, the 
243 Id. at 648. 
244 Id. at 649-50. 
245 Id. 
248 Id. at 652. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 651 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigations Company, 174 
U.S. 690 (1899) (holding that the Federal government's power to protect the navigability 
of a river was superior to the states'); California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) (holding that the Desert Land Act granted control over 
water rights to the states, including water in public lands); Winters v. United States, 207 
U.S. 564 (1908) (state power over water was held to be inadequate to limit the Federal 
government's treaty-making powers); FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (federal powers 
to build a power project were found to be superior to state powers to conserve fish». 
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Court instead should examine the "allocation of sovereign power" 
between the states and the federal government. This approach is 
implicit in commerce clause analysis, and is precisely what the 
Sporhase court did in requiring the application of the second step 
of the commerce clause analysis, the burdens-to-benefits balanc-
ing test. 
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis of the ownership issue 
stops short. The Court did not dismiss the relevance of Nebraska's 
claim of ground water ownership because it recognized the lim-
ited relevance of any claim to ownership. Failing to recognize that 
any claim of ownership in itself has limited significance, it dis-
missed the state's claim because it distinguished private own-
ership from state ownership, finding the latter to be a "legal 
fiction."249 Yet, the Court reached the right result in refusing to 
determine the extent of Nebraska's right to regulate ground 
water based on its claim of ownership. The Court correctly de-
cided that determining the proper roles of the states and the 
federal government in the commercial regulation of ground water 
can only be done by examining the sovereign powers of each and 
evaluating the extent to which regulation by each power is ap-
propriate. However, the Court's cursory and unsatisfying treat-
ment of state ownership as a "legal fiction" and therefore distin-
guishable from other forms of ownership may have resulted in its 
reaching an incorrect result in analyzing the second argument for 
exempting water embargoes from commerce clause analysis, that 
water is not an article of commerce. 
B. Should Water Be Considered an Article of Commerce? 
Nebraska argued that if state regulations prohibit the free 
intrastate trade of ground water, then the regulated water could 
not be considered an article of commerce.250 In his dissent, Justice 
Rehnquist agreed, pointing out that in all prior cases in which the 
Court held that a state embargo violated the commerce clause, 
despite the state's ownership claim, the embargoed article was 
freely traded intrastate.251 In those cases, therefore, the court had 
249 See supra text and notes at notes 126-29. 
250 Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 12-15. 
251 458 U.S. at 963 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 
(1979) (minnows); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); and 
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas». 
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no trouble in finding the embargoed article to be commerce.252 In 
Sporhase, both the state253 and the dissent254 argued that Neb-
raska ground water, on the other hand, is not treated as an article 
of commerce for intrastate trade, so cannot be an article of com-
merce for interstate trade. The Court, however, rejected this ar-
gument solely because it was based on the "fiction" of state own-
ership, without further examining the merits of the claim that 
Nebraska ground water is not an article of commerce.255 
Under Professor Trelease's analysis of state ownership, the 
Court's examination of Nebraska's argument that its ground 
water is not an article of commerce is inadequate. To describe 
state ownership as a legal fiction does not distinguish it from 
other types of ownership. Any form of "ownership" is a fiction in 
that it is a concept created to provide a convenient way to express 
a number of ideas regarding the "owners'" legal rights over the 
article "owned." To describe state ownership in particular as a 
"legal fiction" does not distinguish it from the individual's claim of 
ownership of real or personal property.256 More importantly, the 
"not-in-commerce" argument does not even depend on a claim of 
state ownership. Independent of any ownership claim, a state 
may regulate the trade of a natural resource so that the resource 
lacks the necessary attributes of an article of commerce.257 Rather 
than summarily dismissing the not-in-commerce argument as 
based on "the fiction of state ownership," the Sporhase Court 
should have examined the merits of the state's argument to 
determine if Nebraska ground water was somehow effectively 
diverted from the stream of commerce by the state. Even assum-
252 [d. 
253 Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 12-15. 
254 458 U.S. at 964-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
256 458 U.S. 950-51. 
256 This same analysis has been applied in criticizing the Supreme Court's state 
ownership analysis in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1978). See supra text and notes 
at notes 227-34. In particular, it was argued that: 
[O]f course, all property ownership is a legal fiction, an elaborate system of 
socially sanctioned links between various fact situations and their conse-
quences. So the [Hughes] Court's recognition that wild minnows have not yet 
been reduced to anyone's individual possession is, in itself, no explanation why a 
state should be forbidden to discriminate in access to them." 
Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned 
Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71, 96 (1980). 
257 The state's authority to regulate water use need not be based at all on state 
ownership, but arises out of the state's police powers independent of any ownership 
interest. Trelease, supra note 239, at 644. 
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ing that the concept of state ownership confers no power on the 
state, it is still necessary under the Court's analysis to first define 
"commerce," and then to apply that definition to Nebraska 
ground water. 
The Supreme Court has held that "interstate commerce is an 
intensely practical concept drawn from the normal and accepted 
course of business,"258 and that "commerce among the states is not 
a technical legal conception but a practical one .... "259 In a very 
practical sense, the restricted exchange of Nebraska ground 
water does not occur in a manner consistent with the "normal and 
accepted course of business." On several occasions, the Court has 
stated that for profit exchange is a necessary element of an ar-
ticle of commerce.260 Nebraska ground water may not be sold for 
profit, and may be transferred, either intrastate or interstate, 
only if it is in the public interest.261 An argument can be made, 
independent of any claim to state ownership, that because Ne-
braska ground water may not be freely sold for profit,262 that it is 
not an article of commerce.263 The Court could have avoided this 
258 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231 (1947). 
259 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). See also Walling v. Jacksonville 
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943); Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933). 
260 See Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (holding that contraband cannot be an 
article of commerce); Young v. Kellex Corp., 82 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Tenn. 1948) (holding 
that an atomic bomb, because it is not for sale, was not an article of commerce). Although 
in Kellex Corp. the district court was deciding the meaning of commerce within the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, it relied on the Supreme Court decision interpreting "commerce" 
for purposes of commerce clause analysis. The Court held that "commerce is passing of 
merchandise from one state to another, from one person to another, to be sold in 
competition with other goods in ordinary channels of trade." 82 F. Supp. at 958. "The 
atomic bomb is not a merchantable article in the sense that it is for sale." 82 F. Supp. at 
959. "[T]rade and profit motives are discernible as inseparable from commerce." 82 F. 
Supp. at 960; Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 
(1937) (holding that although it is a non-profit organization, the activities of the Asso-
ciated Press constituted commerce because "[i]t was an instrumentality set up by 
constituent members who are engaged in a commercial business for profit." 301 U.S. at 
128. 
261 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 12-15. 
262 The majority in Sporhase held that municipal water supply arrangements, by 
which water is sold from rural to urban municipalities, contradict the state's claim that 
water is not sold in commerce. 458 U.S. at 952-53. The Court further found that limiting 
the price which may be charged to the cost of distributing the water was simply price 
regulation, and did not remove the water sold from the definition of commerce. Id. It may 
be argued, however, that selling water for cost lacks the profit element which may be 
necessary for commerce, see supra note 260, and is consistent with the concept that the 
seller has only a usufructuary right to sell, not the water itself. 
283 See, however, In Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891), in which the Court stated: 
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complex and troubling issue entirely simply by finding that the 
Nebraska statute affected commerce. It did not have to find that 
the statute regulated an article of commerce to find that the 
statute was subject to commerce clause analysis. Under the 
Court's modern analysis of commerce clause issues, "commerce" 
is interpreted quite broadly.264 It extends far beyond the inter-
state exchange of articles of commerce. The Court has adopted an 
economic approach to defining commerce, in which the Congress 
may regulate not only interstate commerce itself but all activities 
which have an economic effect on commerce.265 The majority in 
Sporhase could have found that the restrictions on Nebraska 
ground water had a sufficient economic impact on interstate 
commerce to determine that the statute fell within the commerce 
clause without finding that the water itself is an article of com-
merce.2OO In this way, even if the Court had found that Nebraska 
ground water was not an article of commerce, it still would have 
been justified in reaching the second part of the commerce clause 
analysis, the balancing test. The Court, however, found Nebraska 
ground water to be an article of commerce, without addressing 
the real question posed by this issue. The Court therefore glossed 
[If] the State ha[s] the power to declare what should be a article of lawful 
commerce in the particular State ... [then] it takes from Congress, and leaves 
with the states, the power to determine the commodities, or articles of property, 
which are the subjects of lawful commerce. Congress may regulate, but the 
States determine what shall or shall not be regulated .... The police power 
would not only be a formidable rival, but, in a struggle, must necessarily 
triumph over the commercial power, as the power to regulate is dependent upon 
the power to fix and determine upon the subjects to be regulated .... For these 
reasons, I think the case cannot depend on the reserved power in the State to 
regulate its own police." 
140 U.S. at 558-59 (quoting License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 600-01 (1847». See also 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978) (holding that "all objects of interstate 
trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset."). 
264 See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 151-56. 
265 See e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
The Court has rejected all mechanical tests previously used to determined what was 
"commerce" under the commerce clause, such as distinguishing subjects requiring uni-
form regulation from those subject of local concern (Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 
(12 How.) 299 (1851); distinguishing production from transportation (United States v. 
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895»; determining what fell within the "stream of com-
merce" (Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905»; and distinguishing activities 
having a direct versus an indirect effect on commerce (Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 
251 (1918) (overruled by U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935». See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 150-57. 
266 This was the position taken by the dissent. See 458 U.S. at 961-62 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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over a complex issue which it could have avoided entirely simply 
by finding that the Nebraska statute affected interstate com-
merce. 
The Court's reliance on a "legal fiction" analysis of the not-in-
commerce argument was inadequate. The Court failed to 
squarely address whether a state could regulate water in a man-
ner that it is not an article of commerce. Nevertheless, because 
those regulations which merely affect commerce, even remotely, 
are within the scope of the commerce clause, the Court was cor-
rect in rejecting Nebraska's claim that its regulation of ground 
water exempted its embargo statute from commerce clause 
scrutiny. Ground water could not be distinguished from privately 
owned and freely traded articles for purpose of commerce clause 
analysis, because whether or not the water itself is an article of 
commerce, it clearly has an effect on commerce. Under the Court's 
expansion of the scope of the commerce clause to include all 
activities which merely affect commerce,267 any water embargo 
statute would be subject to the strictures of the commerce clause. 
The Court's expansion of the scope of the commerce clause 
affected state authority over water in other ways as well. This 
expansion also prohibits a state from arguing that the regulation 
of a commercial activity which is of extreme importance to the 
welfare of its citizens could be immune from commerce clause 
restrictions. Thus, under modern commerce clause analysis, the 
third argument for exempting water embargo statutes from 
commerce clause scrutiny-the police powers argument-must 
also fail. 
c. The State Police Powers Argument 
The Sporhase court upheld certain provisions of the Nebraska 
statute, in part because it found that a state's power to preserve 
limited water supplies to protect the health of its citizens to be "at 
the core of its police power."268 Yet, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that because water is essential for human survival, the 
state's police power to regulate its use is so great that it precludes 
any federal interference through the commerce clause.269 The 
police powers argument was earlier relied on by the Court in 
267 See supra text and note at note 158. 
268 458 U.S. at 956. 
269 [d. at 952-53. 
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Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter270 in upholding the New 
Jersey embargo on the export of surface waters. Since Hudson 
County, the state's interest in preserving its water has vastly. 
increased. The question remains, therefore, whether the Sporhase 
court could have gone further and held that because of water's 
unique nature, it falls completely within a state's police power, 
permitting a state in all instances to hoard water for its own 
citizens-or, whether commerce clause doctrine had so changed 
since Hudson County that despite the vital nature of water to the 
health of a state's citizens, it could only be regulated within the 
parameters of the commerce clause. 
1. State Police Powers Over Natural Resources 
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, the Court upheld the 
New Jersey water embargo statute against the commerce clause 
challenge by reference to the state ownership theory enunciated 
in Geer. While the Court referred to the state ownership argu-
ment, its decision was based primarily on a recognition of state 
police powers. Most of the Court's opinion addressed the "just 
compensation"271 challenge to the statute. The Court rejected this 
claim not because of state ownership, but because of the excep-
tional police powers which the Court found were possessed by the 
states under Geer272 to regulate water.273 
Having found that the protection of its natural resources falls 
within the sovereign powers274 of the state, the Court held that 
"few public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and inde-
270 209 U.S. 349 (1908). 
271 Under a just compensation claim, the property owner claims that the government 
has denied him the right to enjoy his property, in violation of the fourteenth and/or fifth 
amendments. See e.g., Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
The fifth amendment states, in pertinent part, that "private property [shall not] be taken 
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
272 See supra text and notes at notes 213-21. 
273 The Hudson County Court held that: "we prefer to put the authority which cannot 
be denied to the State upon a broader ground than that which was emphasized below, 
since in our opinion it is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum of title 
that the State may be said to possess." 209 U.S. at 355. 
274 A state's sovereign powers include those of the British Parliament, which vested in 
the American people at the time of the revolution. See Martz & Grazis, Interstate 
Transfers of Water and Water Rights-The Slurry Issue, 23 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33, 
50-51 (1977) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 133 (1877». These powers include the police 
power to regulate in furtherance of health, safety, and welfare, the compact power to 
enter into agreements with other states, and the parens patriae power to protect the 
common interests of state citizens, in litigation and otherwise. 
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pendent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a 
State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substan-
tially undiminished .... "275 The Court concluded that the private 
landowners' interest in water could not override the state's 
greater interest in preserving water for the general welfare.276 
The export embargo was, therefore, upheld under the theory that 
it was a proper exercise of the police powers of the state.277 
A state's authority to preserve its vital natural resources under 
its police powers, however, was cut back substantially by the 
same line of cases which undermined the state ownership 
theory.278 Most significantly, the Supreme Court held that natural 
resource export restriction would be upheld only if the state 
interest advanced by the statute is not economic, and if the stat-
ute does not unreasonably discriminate against non-residents. 
For example, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,279 the Court struck 
down a West Virginia statute requiring that gas suppliers give its 
citizens preference in the distribution of natural gas. The Court 
rejected the State's asserted rationale of conservation, finding 
instead that the purpose of the Act w.as economic, and therefore 
not within the State's police powers.280 
In Douglas v. Seacoast Products Inc.,281 the Court struck down a 
statute which had a legitimate purpose, conservation, but which 
unreasonably discriminated against non-residents. In striking 
down a statute prohibiting non-residents from obtaining a fishing 
license, the Court held in this case that such statutes cannot place 
the burden of conservation entirely on non-residents. Valid con-
servation statutes must impose similar restrictions on resources 
used by residents as well.282 The Sporhase decision is consistent 
275 209 u.s. at 356. 
276 [d. 
277 [d. 
278 See Note, supra note 68, at 1273-75; supra text and notes at notes 222-34. 
279 262 U.S. 553 (1923). 
280 [d. at 599. 
281 431 U.S. 265 (1977). 
282 The Court found that: 
A statute that leaves a State's residents free to destroy d natural resource while 
excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conservation law at all. It bears 
repeating that a 'state may not use its admitted powers to protect the health 
and safety of its people as a basis for suppression competition' .... A State 
cannot escape this principle by cloaking objectionable legislation in the cur-
rently fashionable garb of environmental protection. 
[d. at 285 n.21. 
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with the limits placed on state powers over natural resources by 
decisions such as Pennsylvania v. West Virginia and Seacoast 
Products. The Court found that restrictions on water exports 
could be justified if they actually promoted conservation, not just 
the commercial interests of the state, and only if intrastate trade 
was similarly restricted. Therefore, in one sense, the decision to 
permit water embargoes only in limited circumstances was prop-
er, given the Court's earlier treatment of embargoes on fish, 
natural gas, and other resources. 
In another way, however, this analysis is inadequate. Water is 
different from other natural resources, and had been treated dif-
ferently by both Congress and the courts. An argument can be 
made that the Court should have recognized water's unique na-
ture, and treated it differently under commerce clause analysis. 
The essential role that water plays in interstate commerce, how-
ever, clearly requires that its regulation be subjected to the re-
straints of the commerce clause. 
2. Police Powers: Is Water a Unique Natural Resource? 
Water is different from fish, natural gas, minnows and other 
resources whose regulation had been examined by the Supreme 
Court. Water is unique in that it is the only natural resource 
which a state and its citizens cannot exist without. Its supply is 
limited and cannot be readily controlled. In addition, unlike fish 
and natural gas, it is vital to both the economic and physical 
health of a state's citizens. While embargoes on water exports are 
clearly beneficial to the agriculture and industry of an arid state, 
they also serve to promote the health and welfare of its citizens. 
The federal government has recognized that water is a unique 
commodity. The Supreme Court has observed that Congress has 
consistently deferred to the states in the regulation of water.281 
This deference was manifested in a number of ways: by con-
gressional approval of interstate water compacts;284 by continued 
congressional deference to state water law in enacting federal 
water project legislation;285 and by the Supreme Court's recogni-
2&'l California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 654 (1978). 
284 See supra note 146. 
285 The State noted that in 37 federal statutes affecting water rights, Congress re-
quired that the statute be implemented in accordance with the requirements of state 
water law. Brief of Appellee, supra note 131, at 22-25. 
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tion of a state's right to regulate the waters within its bound-
aries.286 
A number of factors account for this deference. Undoubtedly, 
the primary reason is that water is as essential to the continued 
existence of a state as a sovereign entity as the land within its 
borders.287 Without water, a state cannot survive, and without 
substantial continued supplies, the economic development of a 
Western state is impossible. Inasmuch as the very existence of a 
state is dependant upon its ability to maintain an adequate water 
supply, it can be argued, its regulation should not be subject to 
the same commerce clause scrutiny as the regulation of fish and 
natural gas. A state should be permitted, according to the analy-
sis, to hoard water for its own citizens. It should not have to 
sacrifice ·its own existence for its neighbor. 
As was found by the majority in Sporhase, however, a holding 
that state regulation of water would never violate the commerce 
clause would require a corresponding finding that Congress may 
not regulate water in a manner inconsistent with state law.288 
Although water is clearly essential to the health and welfare of a 
state's citizens, and is thus within a state's police powers, it also 
plays a vital role in interstate commerce. The Sporhase majority 
noted that over eighty percent of U.S. water supplies are used in 
agriculture, and that worldwide agriculture markets represent 
the prototypical commercial activity which the framers believed 
should be subject to federal regulation.289 In addition, the Court 
held that the multistate nature of the Ogallala Aquifer-the body 
of water underlying appellant's land, which extends from Col-
orado and Nebraska to Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma and 
Kansas-underscores the significant federal interest in the con-
286 See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935); 
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
287 See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). "The regulation of the use 
and disposal of ... waters ... if it be within the power of the State, is among the most 
important objects of government." 221 U.S. at 258 (quoting the state court opinion in 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 701 (1906). See also Pennsylvania 
v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); State ex reI. Corwin v. Indiana and Ohio Oil, Gas & 
Mining Co., 120 Ind. 575,22 N.E. 778 (1889); Comment, "It's Our Water!"-Can Wyoming 
Constitutionally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER REVIEW 
118, 124·28 (1975). 
288 458 U.S. at 953·54. But see the dissent of Justice Rehnquist, in which he finds that, 
"the authority of Congress under the power to regulate interstate commerce may reach 
a good deal further than the mere negative impact of the commerce clause .... " 458 U.S. 
at 962·63 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
289 458 U.S. at 953. 
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servation and fair allocation of water.290 Given that there are 
aspects of water regulation which clearly affect interstate com-
merce, it would be improper to prohibit federal regulation en-
tirely. 
That water should be subject to national regulation also seems 
consistent with the purpose of the commerce clause. In particular, 
a state embargo on water to preserve the resource solely for its 
own citizens can be viewed as the very sort of evil which the 
commerce clause was designed to prevent. The Supreme Court 
has consistently interpreted the commerce clause as arising from 
"the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would 
have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that 
had plagued relations among the colonies and later among the 
states .... "291 A determination that no state or states should be 
able to become "the OPEC of the the midwest"292 is certainly 
consistent with the idea that "the peoples of the several states 
must sink or swim together .... "293 
Finally, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the idea that 
solely because a state regulation has a legitimate health, safety or 
200 Id. 
291 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), finding that "[t]he [commerce] clause was designed in part to 
prevent trade barriers that had undermined efforts of the fledgling States to form a 
cohesive whole following their victory in the Revolution ." 426 U.S. at 807; H.P. Hood & 
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), which held that: 
Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
exports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. 
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the 
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given 
it reality. 
336 U.S. 539. 
It should be noted, however, that such was not the unanimous view of the framers. The 
failure of the commerce clause to mention a limitation on state powers may have 
resulted from a division between the delegates at the Constitutional Convention who 
favored a strong central government, and those who believed that state sovereignty 
must be the backbone of the new union. Concerned more with coming to agreement on 
the general issues, the Convention may have deliberately left unsettled the extent of 
state authority over commerce. See Browde & Dumars, State Taxation of Natural 
Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. 
REV. 7, 12-13 (1981). 
292 This may be exactly what the governors of several midwestern states have in mind 
for the Great Lakes. See generally Golden, supra note 1. 
293 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
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welfare objective, the Court should turn its head from the regula-
tion's burden on interstate commerce. In Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seelig,294 the Court noted that a health, safety, or welfare objec-
tive can be found in aU regulations. Therefore, treating purported 
health, safety, or welfare regulations differently "would be to eat 
up the rule under the guise of an exception .... [T]o give entrance 
to that excuse would be to invite a speedy end of our national 
solidarity."295 The Sporhase Court was, therefore, correct in reject-
ing the argument that the importance of water to the health and 
welfare of a state's citizens justifies all restrictions on its export, 
regardless of the burden on interstate commerce. Since the Court 
accepted this argument in Hudson County, state authority over 
the natural resources within its borders has been narrowed, while 
the scope of activities which fall within the purview of the com-
merce clause has been expanded. Given the vital role which water 
plays in our national economy, it would have been inconsistent 
with the Court's modern view of commerce, as well as the framer's 
view of the role of the commerce clause in promoting a unified 
national economy, for the Court to hold that the hoarding of water 
by an individual state could not under any circumstance violate 
the commerce clause. 
In its role as regulator of water use, therefore, a state must be 
subjected to constitutional scrutiny. If the state were acting in 
another capacity, however-as a market participant, for example, 
not a regulator-its actions might fall outside the purview of the 
commerce clause. This fourth argument for exempting water em-
bargo statutes from the scope of the commerce clause-the state 
as market participant exception-will now be examined. 
D. The State as Market Participant 
When a state itself acts as a participant in the marketplace, and 
not simply as a regulator of other market participants, it may 
discriminate against non-citizens without violating the commerce 
clause.2OO In listing the reasons that a state may grant a limited 
preference to its own citizens in the allocation of a limited water 
supply, the Sporhase Court noted that "water has some indicia of 
a good publicly produced and owned," citing their earlier decision 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
200 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 
U.S. 429 (1980). 
154 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:103 
ih Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.297 The Court considered this "indicia" of 
market participation to be only a factor that weighed in favor of 
permitting a limited preference; it did not find it sufficient to 
remove water from the scope of the commerce clause. 
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap COrp.,298 the Court carved out the 
state as market participant exception to the commerce clause. 
The Court found that in purchasing automobile hulks to encour-
age recycling, Maryland could require extensive documentation 
evidencing ownership from non-residents, but not residents, 
without violating the commerce clause. The Court found that 
"[nJothing in the purposes animating the commerce clause prohib-
its a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participat-
ing in the marketing and exercising the right to favor its own 
citizens over others."299 The Court, therefore, distinguished such 
activities from regulations impeding interstate commerce.300 
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake':lOl the Court again relied on the market 
participant concept in finding that South Dakota could limit the 
sale of cement produced by a state owned and operated cement 
plant to state citizens, when faced with a cement shortage. The 
majority found that the commerce clause encompasses only state 
taxes and regulatory activities which burden interstate com-
merce. It was not intended to prevent a state from acting freely in 
the marketplace.302 The Court also determined that "[rJestraint in 
this area is ... counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, 
the role of each state as guardian and trustee for its people."303 
An argument could be made that Nebraska controlled the dis-
tribution of water not as a market regulator, but rather as a 
market participant. The Court in Reeves upheld South Dakota's 
right to sell cement solely to its own citizens by finding that the 
existence of the cement could be attributed to the efforts of the 
state itself.304 The Court found, therefore, that like providing fire 
and police protection only to its own citizens, it was not protec-
tionism for the state to sell its cement only to South Dakota 
291 447 U.S. 429 (1980), cited in Spor-hase, 458 U.S. at 957. 
298 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 
299 Id. at 810. 
300 Id. at 806. 
301 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
302 I d. at 436-37. 
303 Id. at 438. 
304 Id. at 442. 
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citizens.305 Similarly, as the Sporhase Court held, Nebraska 
ground water is like South Dakota cement in that its supply 
resulted directly from the efforts and sacrifices of the state 
through its conservation plan.306 In addition, as conceded by the 
Sporhase majority, Nebraska does have some claim to ownership 
of its water.307 Thus, as the Court found, Nebraska ground water 
has some qualities of a publicly owned and produced good.308 The 
Nebraska statute, therefore, can be viewed not as a state regulat-
ing the activities of private parties in the marketplace, but as a 
state determining the circumstances under which it will distrib-
ute its own resource. As a market participant, not a market 
regulator, a state's prohibition of water exports would be pro-
tected by the market participant exception. 
The Court's decision in Reeves, however, precludes such an 
argument. Unlike the state activities upheld in both Hughes and 
Reeves, Nebraska's activity did not actually constitute entering 
the marketplace itself. Nebraska was not actually selling water, 
but regulating the sale of water by others. 
In addition, three factors which the Reeves Court found neces-
sary to uphold the South Dakota statute are missing from the 
facts brought before the Sporhase Court.309 First, the Reeves Court 
relied on the fact that South Dakota was giving preference to its 
own citizens in the distribution of a resource owned by the state 
and paid for by state revenues.310 Even if one accepts the concept 
of state ownership of water,311 Nebraska water is distinguishable 
from South Dakota cement in that it is not a benefit paid for by 
state revenues. 
Second, the Court upheld the South Dakota statute because it 
did not constitute a ban on the export of a natural resource. 
Rather, the statute limited the export of a manufactured product, 
derived from natural resources.312 This distinguished the South 
Dakota statute from those limiting access to minnows,313 landfill 
305 [d. 
306 458 U.S. at 957. 
307 [d. at 956. 
308 [d. at 956-57. 
309 See Note, supra note 68, at 1267-70. 
310 447 U.S. at 442. 
311 See supra text and notes at notes 210-49. 
312 447 U.S. at 444. 
313 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
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sites,314 and natural gas,315 which had previously been struck down 
by the Court. In Sporhase, however, the export of a natural 
resource, Nebraska ground water, was expressly limited and 
could not be distinguished under this test. 
Third, the Reeves Court held that the South Dakota statute 
could not have been upheld if it had barred the resale of its 
cement by its customers to non-residents or prevented others 
from selling cement to non-residents. This would have constituted 
hoarding, which violates the commerce clause.316 Water anti-
exportation statutes, however, do ban the use of the resource 
altogether, and thus could not be upheld under this requirement 
of the Reeves decision. 
Nebraska's regulation of ground water does have some attri-
butes of market participation. Given that it also constitutes regu-
lation which violates the principles enunciated in Reeves, how-
ever, the Sporhase Court could not have found the Nebraska 
statute to be exempt from commerce clause restrictions under the 
market participant exception.317 
The market participation exception was created, in part, in 
deference to the sovereign role of the state as protector of its 
citizens.3ls The concept of sovereignty appears periodically 
throughout the debate over state control of water.319 Vague no-
tions that federal regulation of individual water rights somehow 
encroaches on the state's separate and independent existence, 
while appealing, play a limited role in the actual distribution of 
powers between the federal government and the states. Aside 
from its implicit role in commerce clause analysis, the concept of 
314 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
31. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 
221 U.S. 229 (1911). 
31. 447 U.S. at 444. 
317 See also Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and 
State-owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REV. 71, 92 (1980), in which the authors argue that the 
Reeves market participation exception should be limited to restrictions on the initial 
disposition of a resource, and to "truly" state-owned resources. It should not be applied 
to subsequent dispositions by the initial purchaser, or to property which the state 
"owns" but does not actually possess-such as ground water under private land. 
31. 447 U.S. at 438. 
319 For example, in his dissenting opinion in Sporhase, Justice Rehnquist observed 
that the preservation of natural resources and water in particular has been recognized 
to be the sole responsibility of the state in its sovereign capacity. 458 U.s. at 963 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 
(1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142, 145-46 (1902». See supra note 161. 
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state sovereignty serves to limit federal commerce powers solely 
through the tenth amendment. The limited restraints imposed on 
the federal commerce power by the tenth amendment are inade-
quate to remove state water use regulations from the scope of the 
commerce clause. 
E. The State Sovereignty Argument 
State authority over water and water rights arises from the 
state's general sovereign powers, through either the police pow-
ers, compact powers, or the right of parens patriae to represent 
citizens of the state to protect their interests.32o A state's 
sovereign powers however, are limited by federal powers, includ-
ing the authority of the Congress to regulate commerce.321 There-
fore, a claim that regulation of water is within a state's sovereign 
authority does not automatically negate federal controls over 
water and water rights.322 Rather, the state sovereign power will 
be balanced against the federal interest in the disputed area.323 
Any argument that the federal regulation of water use is inap-
propriate because water is integral to state sovereignty would 
have to be based on some specific limitation on the federal com-
merce clause powers. 
The tenth amendment is such a limitation.324 Once viewed by 
the Supreme Court as constitutional window dressing, placing no 
specific limitation on the commerce powers of the Congress,325 the 
Court now views the tenth amendment as a specific check on 
federal regulations which impair the sovereignty of the individual 
320 A state's sovereign powers encompass those of the British Parliament, which 
vested in the people at the time of the revolution. These powers include the police power 
to regulate in furtherance of health, safety and welfare, the compact power to enter into 
agreement with other states, and the parens patriae power to protect the common 
interests of state citizens, in litigation and otherwise. See supra note 274. 
321 Martz & Grazis, supra note 274, at 50. 
322 See generally, Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 399 (1961). 
323 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); supra text and notes at 
notes 40-46. 
324 The tenth amendment reads in full: "The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 
159-63. 
325 Between 1936 and 1979, the Court consistently rejected arguments that the tenth 
amendment prohibited Congress from regulating an activity affecting the operations of 
the individual states. See J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 159-60. 
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states.326 In National League of Cities v . Usery, 327 the Court struck 
down as violative of the tenth amendment the application of 
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act to state employees. The majority held that "[w]e have 
repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty 
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired 
by Congress, not because Congress lacks an affirmative grant of 
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Con-
stitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that man-
ner."328 
The authority of a state to take action to ensure a continued 
supply of water has long been recognized as integral to state 
sovereignty.329 It could even be argued that water is essential to 
the very existence of a state as a sovereign political entity. Take 
away a state's water and it exists only as an abstract concept of 
sovereign powers. These powers would be no more abstract than 
if a state's land was taken away. It could certainly be argued that 
water deserves at least the same degree of deference to state 
authority as employee salaries, and that the tenth amendment 
326 Note, however, that since its decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976), the Supreme Court has exhibited reluctance to invoke the tenth amendment 
to prohibit federal regulation of state activities. In all four tenth amendment cases 
considered by the Court since Usery, the Court has upheld the federal regulation. See 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (discussed 
infra, text and notes at notes 311-12); United Transp. Union v. L.I.R.R., 455 U.S. 678 
(1982) (holding that application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad does 
not violate the tenth amendment); FERC v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (the Court 
upheld provisions of the Public Utility Regulation Policies Act against a tenth amend-
ment challenge); EEOC v. Wyoming, 51 U.S.L.W. 4219 (March 2, 1983) (which held that 
application ofthe Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Wyoming game wardens did 
not violate the tenth amendment). EEOC v. Wyoming, in particular, leaves in doubt the 
vitality of the tenth amendment. Although the Supreme Court distinguished Usery, both 
cases involve a similar application of labor regulations to state employees, and the 
successful application of Usery in the near future may be unlikely. Recently, however, 
the Court indicated that it was prepared to re-think entirely its interpretation of the 
tenth amendment. Following initial oral arguments in Donovan v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority, the Court ordered the parties to make new arguments, 
indicating that Usery and its progeny may be abandoned, and a new approach to 
defining state sovereignty under the tenth amendment may be adopted. See Donovan v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, Lab. Cas. (CCH) (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 1981), 
cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3937 (U.S. July 5, 1984) (No. 82-1951); States Rights: A Landmark 
Decision is in the Making, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 24, 1984, at 130. 
327 422 U.S. 833 (1976). 
328 I d. at 845. 
329 See e.g., Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1908). 
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therefore, leaves to the states sole authority over the water 
within its borders.330 
The Court's decision in Usery, and it's subsequent decision in 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,331 
however, precludes such an argument. In Virginia Surface Min-
ing the Court upheld provisions of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act against a tenth amendment challenge. The 
Court determined that, as outlined in its earlier decision in U s-
ery,332 federal regulations will not be found to violate the tenth 
amendment unless three requirements are met: 1) the statute 
must regulate the "states as states;" 2) the regulation must ad-
dress matters that are "attributes of state sovereignty;" and 3) 
there must be a showing that state compliance with the statute 
would directly impair their ability "to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional functions."333 
Even assuming that federal regulation of water use meets the 
latter two elements of the test, it is clear that a statute dictating 
how water is to be used would not be regulating "states as states." 
In discussing this requirement, the Virginia Surface Mining 
Court distinguished the regulation of private individuals, who are 
necessarily subject to both federal and state regulation, from 
330 Even if the regulation of water rights is an activity reserved to the states by the 
tenth amendment, such that Congress could not regulate it, it is not clear that the states 
could regulate water in whatever manner they desire, despite the burden on commerce. 
In all cases in which the tenth amendment was held to reserve the regulation of a 
particular activity to the states, the Court was considering the validity of an affirmative 
act of Congress, not the validity of state action. See e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (striking down the minimum wage and 
overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state employees). 
Nevertheless, if an activity left to the states by the tenth amendment must be 
regulated so as not to burden interstate commerce, certain activities would fall through 
a constitutional crack, incapable of being regulated by the Congress or the states. Such a 
scheme makes little sense in our federalist system. The Supreme Court may have 
indicated agreement with the concept that the regulation of activities reserved to the 
states by the tenth amendment is not limited by the dormant commerce powers of the 
Congress. In discussing the market participation exception to commerce clause limits 
on state regulation, the Reeves court held that "considerations of sovereignty indepen-
dently dicate that marketplace actions involving 'integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions' ... may not be subject even to congressional regulation 
pursuant to the commerce power." 447 U.S. at 429, 438 n.10. It follows easily that the 
intrinsic limits of the commerce clause do not prohibit state marketplace conduct that 
falls within this sphere. 
331 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
332 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
333 452 U.S. at 287-88. 
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federal regulation of the "states as states."334 The tenth amend-
ment does not prohibit federal regulation of the activities of pri-
vate persons and corporations.335 Thus, federal statutes regulat-
ing the actions of private individuals, and not the operations of 
the states themselves, do not constitute a tenth amendment vio-
lation.336 A federal statute dictating when an individual could or 
could not export water, or even legislation regulating the individ-
ual's use of water, would, therefore, be upheld under the Court's 
decision in Virginia Surface Mining as the regulation of private 
individuals, not "states as states." The tenth amendment is thus 
unavailable to protect state authority over water from the scope 
of the commerce clause.337 
F. Is Water Different? Summary 
The Sporhase Court was correct in finding that there are no 
specific exceptions available to remove the Nebraska water em-
bargo statute from the purview of the commerce clause. None of 
the potential arguments-state ownership, water is not an article 
of commerce, police powers, market participation, and state 
sovereignty-could successfully have been advanced by Ne-
braska in support of the proposition that federal regulation of 
water use is not provided for by the Constitution. 
In addition, an analysis of the above arguments indicates that 
given the current broad scope of the federal commerce power, and 
the concurrent demise of the state ownership doctrine and state 
police powers over natural resources, a successful constitutional 
challenge to any federal regulation of water rights is unlikely. 
More significantly, any state regulation of water rights could be 
struck down as a violation of the commerce clause, if it can be 
established that the statute's burden on interstate commerce 
outweighs its local benefits. In short, water can no longer be dis-
tinguished from other natural resources as something so vital to 
334 Id. at 286. 
335 Id. 
336 Id. 
337 The Ninth Circuit has agreed that the tenth amendment does not prohibit Con-
gress from regulating state waters, even if the state claims ownership of the waters. See 
State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1252 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding 
the constitutionality of federal statutes regulating the use of motorboats on state 
waters). 
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the existence of a state that it falls outside the purview of the 
commerce clause. 
The Supreme Court was on solid ground in finding that state 
regulation of water rights should be subjected to commerce clause 
scrutiny. Yet, the Court's analysis in reaching that conclusion, 
and the manner in which it then balanced the competing federal 
and state interests in Nebraska ground water under traditional 
commerce clause analysis, raises unsettling questions. In particu-
lar, the Sporhase decision raises questions as to whether both 
water policy and commerce clause doctrine would have been bet-
ter served by judicial deference to congressional authority in this 
area. 
VI. RECONCILING COMPETING STATE AND FEDERAL INTERESTS 
IN WATER 
Any challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute poses 
difficult problems which can only be resolved by balancing the 
complex, competing federal and state interests in the regulated 
area. While the Court is often called upon to resolve these prob-
lems through commerce clause analysis, such issues might argu-
ably be better settled by the Congress in some instances. Even 
though the Sporhase Court clearly had the authority and judicial 
tools necessary to resolve these questions, their resolution by the 
Congress rather than the Court might have been more appropri-
ate from both a policy and constitutional perspective. 
This section will first establish the judicial validity of the 
Court's decision in Sporhase. It will be shown that the way in 
which the Court balanced the competing federal and state inter-
ests in Nebraska ground water was consistent with traditional 
commerce clause analysis. It will also briefly examine the degree 
to which the outcome of the Court's balancing test was consistent 
with federal water policy. Next, this section will argue that while 
consistent with traditional commerce clause analysis and federal 
policy, the manner in which the Court applied the commerce 
clause balancing test in Sporhase reveals that traditional com-
merce clause analysis is too blunt an instrument with which to 
parcel out the delicate and competing federal state interests in 
water. Finally, this section will conclude that the Court could 
have recognized its limited capacity to resolve such disputes, and 
left the issue of water rights to be regulated by the Congress. 
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A. Balancing State and Federal Interests under the Commerce 
Clause 
Having correctly decided that there were no specific exceptions 
which protect state water embargoes from commerce clause 
scrutiny, the manner in which the Sporhase Court balanced the 
state and local interests in water was consistent not only with 
well established commerce clause principles, but also with the 
Court's past approach to water issues, and with federal water 
policy as well. Although the result reached by the Sporhase Court 
was therefore proper, employing traditional commerce clause 
analysis is not necessarily the best way to balance these compet-
ing interests. Ultimately, both water policy and commerce clause 
doctrine may have been better served if the Court had deferred to 
the Congress to judge the propriety of the Nebraska statute. 
1. The Court's Holding Was Consistent with Traditional 
Commerce Clause Analysis and National Water Policy. 
The Court was correct in finding that there was no available 
exception which would have entirely removed state regulation of 
water rights from the scope of the commerce clause. Having 
reached the second stage of its commerce clause analysis, the 
result reached by the Court was also consistent with prior deci-
sions in which it balanced the state interest in the regulated 
subject against the federal interest in interstate commerce. In 
this sense the Court's decision is supportable and well founded. 
The Court's finding that water embargoes may be constitu-
tional if, and only if, the restrictions are strongly tied to needed 
conservation policies is consistent with the Court's general ap-
proach to restricting state police powers under the dormant com-
merce powers of the Congress. The more a statute looks like 
economic protectionism, the more likely that the statute will be 
struck down. The more it appears to reflect a legitimate concern 
for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and not an 
attempt to improve the economic position of residents to the 
detriment of non-residents, the more likely it will be upheld.338 It is 
therefore consistent with this approach to find that export re-
strictions will be upheld if intrastate use is similarly limited, and 
that outright bans may be upheld if the state is demonstrably 
338 See supra text and note at note 145. 
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arid, and the statute is closely tied to state efforts to cope with its 
water shortage. 
In addition, the result reached by the Court in granting great 
deference to the states to regulate water use and to restrict 
exports is consistent with the Court's own prior recognition of the 
wisdom of granting states significant authority to regulate the 
use of water within their borders.339 Under the Court's balancing 
test, the Court correctly gave considerable weight to a state's 
extraordinary interest in preserving the water within its bound-
aries. 
It is also noteworthy that continued deference to state water 
law is consistent with what may appropriately be called the na-
tional water non-policy.340 There has been little if any movement 
in the federal government or the states away from the traditional 
view that water is properly a local concern, and that the states 
should have primary control over the water within their bor-
ders.341 Given the level of Western interest in water, it is fair to say 
that the Court's decision also comported with political realities.342 
2. The Applicability of Traditional Commerce Clause Analysis to 
State Regulation of Water 
The Court's finding that states should be given considerable 
deference in restricting water exports, so long as the regulation is 
reasonably tied to the legitimate goal of conservation, is consis-
tent with the principles the Court has laid down for balancing 
state police interests against federal commerce interests. It was 
also consistent with earlier decisions in which the Court has held 
that the states should be granted considerable deference in reg-
ulating water. The Court was also correct in finding that there 
was no specific exception available to remove water regulation 
from the purview of the commerce clause. Nevertheless, the 
Court's application of traditional commerce clause analysis to the 
Nebraska statute raises problems which indicate that the Su-
preme Court may not be the proper forum in which to resolve the 
complex issues posed by state regulations of water which burden 
interstate commerce. At the very least, the Court's decision indi-
339 See supra text and notes at notes 283-86. 
340 See supra text and notes at notes 13-14, 204-06. 
341 See supra text and notes at notes 204-06 . 
... See supra text and notes at notes 1-55,204-08. 
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cates that traditional commerce clause analysis is a clumsy tool 
with which to balance competing state and federal interests over 
water. 
The Court has consistently struck down all embargoes on ex-
ports of natural resources as violative of the purpose of the com-
merce clause.343 The Court has continually held that the com-
merce clause was designed to insure a unified economy; that no 
one state can work as a separate economic unit to the detriment 
of the whole.344 With regard to the imposition of embargoes on the 
export of natural resources in particular, the Court has held that: 
If the States have such a power a singular situation might 
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the northwest its 
timber, the mining States their minerals, and why not the 
products of the field be brought within the principle? .... To 
what consequences does such power tend? If one State has it, 
all States have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo, 
and commerce will be halted at state lines.345 
Yet the Court found that water embargoes are sometimes per-
missible. The state's extraordinary interest in its water justifies 
this result under a traditional commerce clause analysis. The 
question remains, however, whether a traditional commerce 
clause analysis is the appropriate tool with which to balance 
federal and state interests over water. Having decided to apply 
such analysis at all, the now-expansive scope of the commerce 
clause forced the Court to treat the Nebraska statute as burden-
ing commerce. Yet, the state's interest in water also forced the 
Court to uphold state regulation of water in a manner inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the commerce clause, as earlier deter-
mined by the Court.346 By finding that even an absolute water 
embargo may not violate the commerce clause in certain cases, 
the Sporhase decision is not consistent with the Court's earlier 
decisions holding that the commerce clause permits no embargoes 
on natural resources. Presumably, the judicial justification for 
permitting absolute water embargoes in times of severe shortage 
is that the interests being protected are health and safety, not 
34a See supra text and notes at notes 56-60. 
344 See supra text and notes at notes 285-93. 
345 West v. Kansas National Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). 
346 The Court did strike down the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska statute. Most of 
the Court's opinion, however, indicates a deference to the states over the regulation of 
water rights which it has not recently granted with regard to any other "article of 
commerce." 
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commerce. The spectre of federal courts, examining water sup-
ply data and state plans for use of its water to determine if the 
drought is sufficiently severe and to ensure that the water will 
not be used to benefit the local economy, highlights the folly of 
attempting to make such a distinction. It is for this reason that 
the Court had earlier wisely held that to permit this distinction 
"would be to eat up the rule under the guise of an exception" and 
"would be to invite a speedy end to our national solidarity."347 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that given the interstate 
dimension of water sources such as the Ogallala Aquifier,348 it is 
likely that if one state is suffering from a severe water shortage, 
other states may be as well. Thus, since both interests increase or 
decrease proportionally, a balancing of the state interests in 
water conservation against the federal interest in preventing 
significant burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce be-
comes a futile exercise. 
This situation can also be cast in terms of constituting a prob-
lem in defining the federal interest being advanced by the Court's 
invocation of Congress' dormant commerce powers. The auto-
matic assumption on the part of the Court that federal interests 
are always on the side of free trade between the states is ques-
tionable with regard to commerce generally.349 When the article 
being traded is limited natural resources, however, the federal 
interest is even less clear.350 With regard to water in particular, it 
is clearly not certain that it is in the national interest in all cases 
to permit the free transfer of water across great distances to arid 
areas.351 Yet, a traditional commerce clause analysis requires this 
assumption. At the very least, there are complex policy issues 
involved in how dwindling water resources should be used, and it 
is not clear that the national interest always falls on the side of 
the free transfer of water across state lines.352 
347 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). 
348 See supra note 132. 
349 See Note, Hughes v. Oklahoma and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission: The 
Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1163 
(1980). 
350 Id. 
351 See generaUy Sheets, Crisis, supra note 1. 
352 Id. The debate over the proposed coal slurry pipeline for example, which would 
further strain limited water supplies in order to transport coal, raises such water policy 
issues. See generaUy Martz & Grazis, supra note 274. 
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B. The Court Could Have Deferred to Congress 
It would not have been without precedent had the Court de-
cided in this case that the issues raised were better handled by 
the Congress than under traditional commerce clause analysis. In 
a very similar situation, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
difficulty of applying traditional commerce clause analysis, and 
left the statute to be struck down by the Congress, if it so chose. 
With regard to market participation by state-owned industries,353 
the Court held in Reeves v. Stake 354 that the commerce clause was 
not applicable, not because there was no federal commerce inter-
est being affected,355 but because commerce clause analysis was 
held to be a clumsy tool with which to sort out federal and state 
interests. In Reeves, the Court held that, "[t]he competing consid-
erations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be 
subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under 
traditional commerce clause analysis. Given these factors, the 
adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited for 
Congress than this Court."356 As discussed above, Nebraska regu-
lation of ground water does not constitute state participation in 
the marketplace, so does not fit within the Reeves exception. Yet, 
just as the states' claim to ownership of its water can be looked at 
as no more than legal shorthand for its great interest in the 
water, a state's "proprietary actions" with regard to a state 
owned business is also legal shorthand for its strong interest in 
that business, particularly given the meaninglessness of the dis-
tinction between "actual ownership" in title and state ownership 
of its natural resource, for purposes of constitutional analysis.357 
In both cases, water and state-manufactured cement, it is the 
state's extraordinary interest in that which is being regulated 
which justifies discrimination against non-residents. It is also this 
same extraordinary interest which gives rise to the "subtle, com-
plex, politically charged," competing considerations which makes 
this regulation difficult to assess under traditional commerce 
clause analysis.358 
353 See supra text and notes at notes 296-319. 
354 447 U.S. 429 (1980). 
355 The Reeves Court held that the commerce clause did not reach state market 
participation, 447 U.S. at 436-37; however, it did not say that the state's actions did not 
burden commerce. 
356 447 U.S. at 439. 
357 Cf Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 256, at 96. 
356 With regard to a related area of water law, Professor Charles E. Corker, a noted 
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The Court's decision reveals the difficulty of balancing federal 
against state interests in water under a traditional commerce 
clause analysis-whether commerce exists in the water at all is 
questionable, and more importantly, the state's extraordinary 
interest in the water tips the scales in favor of the state to such a 
degree that the federal commerce interest is lost. Although sig-
nificant federal deference is justified by the state's interest in 
the water, it clearly conflicts with the purposes of the commerce 
clause. At the very least, Nebraska's great interest in its ground 
water, like South Dakota's great interest in its cement, makes 
traditional commerce clause analysis difficult. Further, a mechan-
ical commerce clause analysis is inadequate for the difficult task 
of balancing the "subtle, complex, [and] politically charged" issues 
inherent in the resolution of water disputes. As it did with state 
market participation, therefore, the Court might have found that 
the balancing of a state's interest in its water against the federal 
commerce interest would be better handled by Congress. 
Had the Court done so, it would of course have been up to the 
Congress to determine the extent to which states can restrict the 
flow of water in interstate commerce.359 Until it chose to exercise 
its authority in this area, the Nebraska statute would have sur-
vived. It is unlikely that Congress would seriously consider usurp-
ing state authority over water rights in the near future. 360 State 
commentator in the field, has observed that the resolution of water disputes may be 
better handled by Congress than the Supreme Court. In discussing the imposition of 
equitable apportionment decrees by the Supreme Court to resolve interstate water, 
Professor Corker observed that "exercise of the original jurisdiction in interstate water 
disputes is a burdensome function to the Supreme Court and one which Congress, 
because of the technical resources available to it, is better equipped to perform than the 
Supreme Court." 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 326 (R. Clark ed. 1967). Although the 
balancing of state and federal water interests does not require the technical expertise 
necessary to allocate the water of an interstate stream between two states under an 
equitable apportionment decree, decisions in both areas raise complex issues of water 
policy and water rights which may better be handled by Congress. 
359 It may be worth noting that in either case, the question is not who will make this 
determination-Congress or the Court-but the way in which Congress' authority in 
this area will be exercised. In striking down a state statute as violative of the commerce 
clause, the Court is, of course, recognizing Congress' dormant powers to regulate where 
the state had regulated. It is, in essence, making a judicial determination that if Con-
gress had wanted to regulate in such a way, it would have done so. Further, Congress 
always has the authority to approve the state regulation after it has been struck by the 
Court, just as if they decided to regulate in this area absent judicial interference. See 
generally J. NOWAK, supra note 26, at 250-52. In this sense, the question is not whether 
state regulation in this area will be policed by the Congress, but how Congress will or will 
not exercise its authority. 
3&) See supra text and notes at notes 203-08. 
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water embargo statutes would therefore remain in force, at least 
for now. Yet, should the worst fears of the experts materialize-
and water does become the "crisis of the 80's"-Congress might 
be forced to impose national regulations on water use. If so, the 
short-term impact of the Sporhase decision on state water policies 
would be negated. One effect of the decision would remain, how-
ever: the unnecessary and unfortunate distortion of commerce 
clause doctrine. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the actual effect of the Sporhase decision on state 
water embargo statutes may be fairly limited, the Supreme Court 
has taken a significant step in finding that water is not a unique 
resource, subject to exclusive control by the states. No longer can 
a state claim that the water within its borders belongs to the 
citizens of the state, for their use only. Since water is now an 
article of commerce, the citizens of every state have an interest in 
all of the waters, and this interest will be protected by the federal 
courts through the commerce clause. 
The finding by the Supreme Court that water is an article of 
commerce is justified under a traditional commerce clause 
analysis-it clearly has a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce, and there are no available exceptions which would totally 
remove water from the scope of the commerce clause. In addition, 
in balancing the state and federal interests in water, the Court 
reached an appropriate result in leaving the states considerable 
authority to restrict water exports to achieve conservation goals 
and even to protect the interests of their own citizens. 
It is precisely this deference to the states under a commerce 
clause analysis, however, which makes the Sporhase decision un-
settling. The decision raises questions as to the applicability of a 
traditional commerce clause analysis to activities such as the 
regulation of water rights in which the state has an exceptional 
interest. A mechanical dormant commerce clause analysis which 
assumes that the federal interest always falls on the side of an 
unrestrained exchange of any articles which have an impact on 
interstate commerce may not be appropriate to all natural re-
sources. The analysis may be particularly inapplicable to water 
resources, which lack some of the commercial elements which 
define an article of commerce, and in which the state has an 
extraordinary interest. Further, subjecting water rights statutes 
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to commerce clause scrutiny forces the Court to apply a simple 
and rigid balancing test to resolve the conflict between state and 
federal interests which are "subtle, complex, politically charged, 
and difficult to assess under traditional commerce clause analy-
SiS."361 The Supreme Court could have deferred to the Congress, 
finding that the competing federal and state interests in this area 
are too difficult to sort out and weigh under a traditional com-
merce clause analysis, and that this process is better handled by 
the Congress. Although state authority over water would still be 
vulnerable, resolving this conflict in the Congress would have 
guaranteed a more thorough examination of the complex and 
competing issues inherent in the debate over state regulation of 
water in interstate commerce. Perhaps more significantly, judi-
cial deference to congressional authority would have left tradi-
tional commerce clause analysis less vulnerable to attack by those 
who would question its applicability to complex questions of na-
tional economic and resource policy, and state sovereignty. 
361 See supra text and notes at notes 356-58. 
